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INTRODUCTION
We are familiar with two kinds of taxes: those that raise reve-
nue and those that aim to induce behavior of one kind or another.1
But the tax system also can be used to gauge preferences in a way
that substitutes for, or even improves upon, a function normally per-
formed by the ballot box or by privately organized surveys. An ex-
ample of this "taxes as ballots" idea is the annual American inquiry
in the form of a checkoff on tax returns, permitting individual tax-
payers to earmark a small amount of their tax payment for the
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1 "Neutral taxes" are those that do the first alone. "Revenue-neutral inducements" would
do the second alone, but such taxes would be difficult to design, and little attention has been
paid to their desirability. In practice, many taxes either intentionally or inadvertently incorpo-
rate both revenue-raising and behavior-affecting features. And if we view the first kind of tax
as "revenue-affecting," rather than "revenue-raising," then most taxes combine these two as-
pects. Thus, an excise tax on cigarettes is likely both to raise revenue and to reduce consump-
tion and production of that product. An income tax exclusion or deduction for health care ex-
penditures or for the cost of health insurance is likely not only to yield less revenue than a
system without such features but also to generate more expenditures on health care and on
the deductible (or favored) forms of insurance. As will become clear, I intend to avoid anything
controversial in these characterizations, for my goal is to focus on a different role for taxes.
Some readers will insist that the preference-revealing role of taxes that I explore in this Article
may be characterized as "behavior-inducing." In some sense, everything associated with the
tax system (including working or investing in a way that produces revenue for the government)
may be labeled as "behavior" affected by the various rules of the system.
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cause of publicly financed presidential campaigns. This example
might seem to have little to do with taxation because respondents
incur no additional costs as a result of their choices.2 On the other
hand, as explored in Part I, there are features of this inquiry on the
tax return that bear little resemblance to a conventional ballot but
have much in common with the structure of taxation. At the same
time, there is a plausible case to be made that this poll has advan-
tages over alternative means of assessing citizen opinion as to the
wisdom and magnitude of public campaign financing.
A second, perhaps less trivial, and certainly very different ex-
ample of balloting associated with the tax system derives from a re-
examination of the role and purpose of the charitable deduction and
the tax-exempt status of a variety of organizations. It is generally
recognized that the deduction stimulates charitable contributions,
but it may be useful to set this familiar view aside. Nearly lost in the
substantial literature on these features of the tax system is the idea
that some tax-exempt recipient organizations do work that the gov-
ernment might otherwise do itself or pay agents to perform.' Part H
of this Article focuses on the charitable deduction as an illustration
of the idea that the tax system can be understood as allowing dis-
persed donors to determine which agents, projects, or causes the
government will finance. The tax deduction essentially casts the
government as a financing partner, with taxpayer-donors serving as
intermediaries or agents4 who choose the providers of, or indeed the
very existence of, certain services.' In an important sense, private
contributions are matched by the government through the charitable
deduction.
The "votes" cast through deductible contributions generate a
measure of preferences that is in some ways superior and in other
ways inferior to other polling devices. Suffrage is restricted. Indeed,
even fewer citizens participate in making deductible contributions
than in the campaign finance scheme, so that decisionmaking di-
verges yet more dramatically from the one-person-one-vote baseline
A number of states have checkoff systems for the public financing of political campaigns
that do cost the respondents directly. The design of these checkoffs is taken up in Part I.C.
By "recipient" I refer only to the fact that these are organizations on the receiving end
of tax-deductible contributions. The fact that they may also receive direct government grants
or contracts plays a small part in the discussion below.
' The partnership metaphor reminds us that these agents are also principals. In this case,
their individual contributions instruct the agent, or government, how much to spend (at least
in tax expenditure terms).
'The deduction might also be seen as affecting the behavior of the providers of such
things as social services and education. Providers necessarily find themselves competing not
only for the attention of bureaucrats, because there are some direct government grants avail-
able, but also for the attention of private donors (who come bearing indirect government
grants).
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that is so familiar. Nevertheless, I hope to show that it is likely that
this system of taxes as ballots, through the deductibility of private
contributions, measures and aggregates citizens' preferences more
satisfactorily than the one-taxpayer-one-vote campaign finance
checkoff scheme. A more important claim is that this balloting
through the tax system also may be superior to conventional voting.
Indeed, the charitable deduction is probably the most useful exam-
ple of what I mean by taxes as ballots. I begin, however, with the
checkoff scheme because it usefully illustrates collective choice
problems that inform the comparison between conventional and tax-
driven ballots-as well as legislative voting. After examining the
campaign finance checkoff in Part I and the charitable deduction in
Part II, in Part III I explore the tension between, or perhaps the
complementary character of, extracting information about prefer-
ences and encouraging private giving. I inspect matching-grant pro-
grams and donor-designation options that have emerged in the phil-
anthropic and private sectors, where they also may be used to gauge
preferences and to induce private contributions. The striking com-
parison to private matching schemes solidifies the description of
balloting through the tax system.
Finally, Part IV goes beyond the charitable deduction and cam-
paign finance examples to return to the social choice questions that
are at the core of the taxes as ballots idea. The question is whether
the legislature might not also delegate other matters to popular de-
cisionmaking of a particular sort through tax deductions or similar
devices.
I. SIMPLE CHECKOFFS AS PROPORTIONAL VOTING
A. Checkoff Mechanics for Financing Presidential Campaigns
The familiar individual return, Form 1040, asks taxpayers
whether they would like to allocate $3 of federal funds to the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund.' As if to emphasize the taxes as
ballots theme and the desire to approach the one-person-one-vote
norm, married taxpayers filing joint returns are offered the opportu-
nity to respond independently and to allocate (or not) $3 each.'
Somewhat surprisingly, and in contrast to the Internal Revenue
Service instructions for such things as charitable deductions,8 the
' This allocation was authorized by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966,
Title I § 302(a), Pub L No 89-809, 80 Stat 1587, codified at 26 USC § 6096 (1994).
See Internal Revenue Service, 1996 1040 Instructions 11 (US Dept of the Treasury
1996).
' See id at A-3. One difference may be that other opportunities reflected on the return
must have been taken by the taxpayer during the tax year and prior to completing the form.
1998]
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instructions to Form 1040 appear to encourage positive responses by
puffing that "[tihe fund reduces candidates' dependence on large
contributions from individuals and groups and places candidates on
an equal financial footing in the general election."'
For every positive response, a special account at the Treasury
is enriched by $3 and, upon certification by the Federal Election
Commission, the contents of the account are dispensed to presiden-
tial candidates by matching the first $250 per individual contributor
received during presidential primaries'0 (subject to a ceiling, which
was $15.4 million in 1996), to political parties to fund national con-
ventions" ($12.4 million to each of the two major parties in 1996),
and to candidates in the general presidential election who agree not
to accept private contributions 2 ($61.8 million each to Clinton and
Dole in 1996)."3 Candidates can receive these funds even as they
benefit from "soft money" given to political parties by individuals,
corporations, and interest groups. In 1980, 28.7 percent of taxpayers
allocated money through this checkoff; by 1994, the positive re-
sponse had dropped to 13 percent.'4 In 1993, these steadily dwin-
Id at 11.
26 USC §§ 9032-37 (1994).
' 26 USC § 9008 (1994).
26 USc §§ 9004-06 (1994).
"For data regarding the 1996 election amounts, see Martin A. Sullivan, Presidential
Checkoff. More Money But More Unpopular Than Ever, 73 Tax Notes 285 (1996) (describing
the recent history of the campaign fund); Federal Election Commission, Annual Report 8-9
(1996) (describing the certification process for the three types of funds).
1 Sullivan, 73 Tax Notes at 287. The revenues generated by most state checkoffschemes
also have been falling. See Checkoff Contributions Continue to Decline, Tax Administrators
News 17 (Mar 1997). This parallel state experience suggests that the key to understanding
checkoff schemes is unlikely to be the manner in which the questions put to taxpayers are
framed.
The decline in affirmative responses, the positioning of the checkoff question at the begin-
ning of Form 1040, anecdotal evidence of taxpayers' explanations for their responses, and the
fact that many citizens give charitable contributions of as little as $3 all contribute to my in-
clination to think of these responses as made by rational actors. Some readers will have a
contrary reaction, and will insist that $3 is too small an amount to take seriously, if only be-
cause one could not possibly think that a $3 reallocation among federal projects could make
any real difference. This skeptical approach to rationality and cooperation is, of course, the
basis of puzzles involving the fact that millions of people vote, that voter turnout is often
higher where the cost of voting is higher rather than lower, that millions of people contribute
to charities, applaud at concerts, pick up litter, and so forth. I would ask the skeptic to explain
also why the government pursues remedies that at the margin seem irrational. If a govern-
ment auditor discovers that taxpayer X has understated her income by $1,000, why bother to
collect the taxes and penalties due? The marginal $1,000 or more could hardly make much of
a difference with respect to the government's overall effectiveness, and one more or one less
piece of enforcement could hardly affect overall deterrence. And if the government is "permit-
ted" to think of many such cases as part of one deterrence strategy, then why can we not think
of many taxpayers and donors as constituting one rational team? In short, there is anecdotal
evidence that people take their checkoff and charitable giving strategies seriously (as they do
their inclinations to boycott products or vendors). There is also a sense in which we can coin-
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dling responses and funds prompted Congress to raise the checkoff
amount from $1 to $3.15
B. The Checkoff as a Form of Democratic Decisionmaking
1. Political participation.
Putting aside the question of why Congress might wish to dele-
gate (or return) to the people the decision as to the funding level of
the campaign financing program, a useful place to begin is with a
comparison of the checkoff and more traditional forms of democracy
or preference revelation as implemented through voting booths on
election days. An obvious focal point of such a comparison is the dif-
ference in political participation under the two schemes. On the one
hand, voters who do not file returns are denied input in the checkoff
scheme, although presumably it would be fairly easy to encourage
nonfilers to submit very simple returns in order to participate in this
decision."6 Inasmuch as this simple checkoff asks for no direct pay-
ment from each "voter,"7 there is not much to the claim that only
citizens who must file returns can be counted on to take the checkoff
decision seriously. Still, voters who need not file tax returns would
surely be more likely to register their preferences on election day
than through this "tax day," or "checkoff day," option. On the other
hand, because the turnout rate is far greater, the overall level of po-
litical participation may well be higher on tax day than on election
bine many such small, serious steps into a coherent picture of cooperative, rational behavior.
In addition to the mysteries of voting, enforcement strategies, and philanthropy, there is
also room to puzzle over the nature of the efforts expended by individual legislators and bu-
reaucrats who play roles in the systems that stand as alternatives to the checkoff or charitable
deduction schemes. It is thus possible to proceed with the modest assertion that, at least where
parallel behavior is at issue, we simply do not understand rationality but we allow for the fact
that other explanations for rational acting may elude us. But there is little reason to think that
this gap in our understanding stands in the way of the taxes as ballots idea any more than it
stands in the way of other, more familiar explanations for what we find and what we do. I am
comfortable with the idea that social norms drive many people to behave as if rational behavior
is appropriate (where it may not be so), but I hope that readers who are unwilling to leap this
far will nevertheless be prepared to make the necessary assumptions in order to think com-
paratively about different methods of democratic decisionmaking.
15 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13441, Pub LNo 103-66, 107 Stat 312,
codified at 26 USC § 6096 (1994).
16 Present federal rules do not respect the preferences of those taxpayers who have a tax
liability of less than $3. If there is a liability at the time the return is filed, or if a tax liability
has already been satisfied through withholding, the response is counted. See 28 USC § 6096(a)
(1994). In no event does an affirmative response increase the amount due from the responding
taxpayer. Some state checkoff programs follow the federal pattern, but others do ask for direct
contributions or for subtractions from refunds due taxpayers. See Part I.C.
17 See note 2 and accompanying text.
IS The tax return might be more attractive if it offered the opportunity to allocate a large
sum of money rather than $1 or $3.
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day. To be sure, turnout for general elections might increase if vot-
ers everywhere could easily cast their ballots over a several-month
period as they now can file their returns.19 Alternatively, we could
use tax returns as the medium through which to record conventional.
votes that presently are entered on election day. I think it is fair to
say that election day is appealing because of conventional views re-
garding political participation, but the checkoff day alternative is
not necessarily inferior." The taste for broad suffrage is probably not
a reason to reject taxes as ballots, although it may suggest some
tinkering with the details of the campaign checkoff scheme.
2. Checkoffs versus referenda and legislation.
a) The collective choice and public goods problems. The
substantive character of the checkoff is, I think, more interesting
than either its operational details or the level of political
participation it can generate. The characteristics of a checkoff are
perhaps easiest to explore by comparing a tax checkoff to a more
conventional exercise in direct democracy, a referendum.21 However,
the comparison does not help to answer the question of why we use
the checkoff where we do, if only because our constitutional
structure does not make room for federal plebiscites.22 One function
19 There are some states that now permit voting over several weeks, but the impact on
turnout is modest at best. See Sam Attlesey, State Leaders Trying to Get Out the Voters, Dallas
Morning News 1A (Feb 17, 1997) (reporting that overall turnout in Texas has not increased
despite the state's switch from one election day to a seventeen-day election period); Lilliard E.
Richardson, Jr. and Grant W. Neeley, Implementation of Early Voting, 69 Spectrum: J State
Govt 16,21 (1996) (examining Tennessee's experience with-a two-week early voting period and
finding a positive effect on turnout). For a compilation of six states' rules regarding voting
periods and a comparision of ordinary absentee voting with early voting, see Margaret Rosen-
field, Early Voting (FEC Natl Clearinghouse on Election Admin 1994).
' I ignore the question of whether respondents are likely to take an issue more seriously
if polled at the time of a general election or through their tax returns. Note also that tax return
information is delivered less anonymously for many taxpayers, because spouses or professional
preparers are likely to have access to responses, but it is unclear whether such a modest depar-
ture from anonymity would affect many responses even if the checkoff approach were expanded
to numerous matters.
1 I use the term "referendum" because it pertains to a question the legislature has "re-
ferred" to the voters for their decision. In contrast, an "initiative" is a voter-initiated question
put to the electorate. The checkoff is thus a referendum. "Plebiscites" form the larger set of
which referenda and initiatives are subsets. A referendum often indicates a constitutional
decision or other matter of great moment, while a plebiscite may refer to any matter decided
by public expression. Unfortunately, this distinction is violated by referring to checkoffs as a
kind of referendum.
The comparison between checkoffs and referenda is sufficiently interesting that I try to
ignore the fact that our federal Constitution does not provide for either referenda or initiatives.
For some discussion and references regarding the absence of a federal mechanism for direct
expression or legislation, see Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Ac-
tion in Local Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev 930,931 & nn 5-6 (1988) (noting that "meaning-
ful participation cannot occur in the national polity"). Of course, candidates might try to pre-
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of the comparison therefore may be to explore the ability of the
checkoff device to serve as a substitute for the absent and
unavailable national referendum.
A conventional referendum is limited almost necessarily to a
few questions with room only for affirmative or negative responses.
It would be easy to use a referendum to ask whether the electorate
supported publicly financed campaigns, but difficult to ask the elec-
torate for its preferences as to either the conditions necessary for a
candidate to qualify for public support or, more basically, the
amount of public support that should be available. A checkoff, on the
other hand, seems reasonably well-suited to determining a level of
funding. For example, the checkoff for the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund provides respondents neither the opportunity to
reject the idea of public campaign funding altogether nor the chance
to approve or disapprove of some specific level of funding. Instead
each respondent is asked to add (or not) $3 to a total. Voters can see
that no agenda-setter is forcing them to an up or down vote on some
strategically set total expenditure; control of the expenditure is in
their combined hands.' Put this way, the checkoff resembles a vari-
ety of private fundraising schemes and seems like a reasonable tool
of social choice, especially where alternatives to it obviously are
flawed.'
There is, however, potential for a serious collective action prob-
lem associated with the checkoff that is absent from the alternative
commit to voters by promising that, if elected, they will do everything in their power to accom-
plish some specified substantive policy. See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 Va L
Rev 567, 575-79 (1996).
I think it is unlikely, however, that the checkoff scheme emerged precisely because of the
unavailability of the more conventional referendum. As we will see, virtually all states with
income taxes make greater use of checkoff schemes than does the federal government, even
though the referendum alternative is available in about half the states. See David B. Magleby,
Direct Legislation in the American States, in David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds, Referen-
dums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy 218,224-29,254-57 (American
Enterprise 1994) (surveying the use of referenda in twenty-seven states and analyzing their
pros and cons). Also, I argue that the taxes as ballots idea is reflected in the charitable deduc-
tion, and this deduction is available under state income tax laws, even in states that allow
referenda.
' I assume that the $3 figure is not coercive in the sense that it seems unlikely that many
respondents would wish to reallocate an amount greater than zero but less than $3. A respon-
dent who yearns for the old $1 checkoff can answer affirmatively once every three years.
' The referendum alternative seems flawed because an agenda-setter would have the
power to set an amount, which voters could only approve or reject. This is a special case of
Riker's well-known point that referenda probably empower overachieving interest groups. See
William H. Biker, Comment on Baker, "Birect Democracy and Discrimination:A Public Choice
Perspective,' 67 Chi Kent L Rev 791, 793 (1991) (explaining that the ability to set the agenda
gives a substantial advantage to the first interest group to act). And legislative decisionmaking
may seem especially untrustworthy when it comes to using public funds for campaigns. But
see note 112.
1998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
decisionmaking mechanisms. A participant in a checkoff does not
know how others are responding, but in order to know how to re-
spond himself, he needs to know or be able to estimate the aggregate
responses of others. Without this information about other responses,
the individual has no idea whether an affirmative response of his
own will support his own preferences or will perversely exacerbate
the aggregate overshooting of his preferred level of funding. A
population of many individuals, all participating under such condi-
tions, would only accidentally produce a result worth defending on
social choice grounds. To the extent that response rates, expendi-
tures from the campaign fund, and the rules, of the game remain
relatively constant, there is no collective action problem, because
individuals can compare past results with the end result they most
prefer and then act accordingly. But it is plausible (and interesting
to imagine) that, with respect to the present checkoff scheme, uncer-
tainty as to the response levels may be created by the declining
number of affirmative responses, the uncertain number of primary
candidates who will make claims on the fund,' the absence of ongo-
ing reporting of response rates, and especially the congressional de-
cision to increase the checkoff amount. This uncertainty may be suf-
ficient to leave many individuals in a position where they do not
know whether the overall level of funding they prefer calls for an
affirmative or negative response to the checkoff." Only those re-
spondents who wish either for greater public financing than pro-
vided under the status quo or for zero (or nominal) public financing
can proceed with complete confidence."
The unexpected number of primary candidates was cited by the Federal Election Com-
mission as a factor in the temporary shortfall in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund in
1996. See Federal Election Commission, Annual Report at 7 (cited in note 13). Taxpayer-
respondents might similarly have been uncertain about how to respond, especially if their own
preferences for public funding were a function of the number of candidates and the need for
more information about these candidates.
' As noted earlier, the increase to a $3 checkoff in 1993 would have made predictions yet
more difficult.
The collective action problem is of course greatest the first time it is encountered. I may
want some public money to go to the campaign financing cause, but ifI knew that other re-
spondents would cause a half-billion dollars to be allocated without my nod, I would surely
withhold "my" $3 in a checkoff scheme. And ifI knew there would be but ten affirmative re-
sponses in the entire country, I would also decline because, when I add my $3, the fund would
have but $33 and would accomplish nothing. I would most like to add $3 to the fund if it were
in some intermediate range, but this kind of preference gathering requires some information;
in the extreme case, adequate information requires multiple questions and contingent re-
sponses, as found in a decision-tree format. Substantial complexities soon overwhelm the ob-
jective. Moreover, as students of comparable single-transferable voting systems will recognize,
perverse outcomes may arise. See William H. Riker, LiberalismAgainst Populism:A Confron-
tation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 48-51 (Freeman 1982).
"The former group's confidence is based only on the perception that most observers of a
declining response rate do not expect an increase in that rate.
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On the other hand, it is arguable not only that most individuals
find their checkoff decisions unaffected by the uncertainties they
perceive, but also that the scheme as a whole can generate a rea-
sonably democratic outcome. Imagine, for example, that 55 percent
of the voters support an expenditure of $200 million and that 45 per-
cent prefer zero, but that a $200 million budget will in fact be gener-
ated by a 20 percent affirmative response rate.2 The 45 percent will
surely decline to add "their" $3 to the pool. The question, however,
is whether it is too fanciful to imagine that about 35 percent of tax-
payers respond negatively, not because they do not support the ex-
penditure, but because they correctly surmise that their own posi-
tive responses would lead to overshooting.
I will refer to the view that stresses the uncertainty about oth-
ers' responses and the interaction between one's response strategy
and these other responses as reflecting the collective action problem
of checkoffs. If it is present, it is a simple coordination problem, but
one that is not solved easily through a typical exercise in direct de-
Note that the collective action problem examined in the text has a counterpart in conven-
tional voting to the extent that voters aim to communicate enthusiasm or caution through the
size of the winning margin. See also text accompanying note 74 (explaining that a candidate
obtains public funding by polling more than a fixed number of votes and that a collective action
problem arises because each voter is unsure whether his vote is needed to reach this number).
There is probably less of a collective action problem in these elections because uncertainty is
reduced through the publication of pre-election survey results. In contrast, private surveys are
not conducted regarding (and news organizations show little interest in) the number of taxpay-
ers inclined to respond affirmatively to the checkoff question on their upcoming tax returns.
The example in the text raises the normative question of how to set the dollar amount
of the checkoff. If the checkoff (or any referendum) could tolerate multiple questions in the
manner of a decision tree, see text accompanying notes 30-31, then there would be a more
complicated question of how to set up the multistage inquiry. One possible strategy is to aim
for an amount likely to induce a 50 percent affirmative response rate. There might, after all,
be a kind of aesthetic appeal to the principle of the median voter's preferences. My intuition
is that there is a tradeoff between the advantages of higher and lower amounts. If each re-
spondent were, for example, offered the opportunity to reallocate $1,000, then many respon-
dents might take the checkoff process quite seriously. On the other hand, high amounts raise
the likelihood of a tyranny of the minority. Thus, with the $3 amount and a 13 percent affirma-
tive response rate, see text accompanying note 14, it is plausible that a majority of voters and
taxpayers approve of the process and approximate budget allocation determined by the check-
off. See text accompanying notes 42-43. But with, say, a $1 million checkoff amount and ap-
proval by one thousand respondents, it would be quite plausible that the other 99.9 percent
of the respondents preferred a budget below the $1 billion amount reallocated by this thou-
sand-person minority. The increase from $1 to $3 in the face of declining enthusiasm, if it is
that, see notes 14-15 and accompanying text, probably suggests that the checkoff amount we
experience has more to do with the legislature's preferences than with some scientific notion
of the correct solution to this problem of setting the amount. But it is at least interesting to
imagine that the increase to $3 was meant to encourage serious thought; an increase to $100
might have been more defensible on these grounds, although the lower approval rate that that
amount would have generated (perhaps less than I percent) might have raised the fear of
tyranny by a minority.
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mocracy. " If such a collective action problem is absent, then, as we
will see, the checkoff procedure is more like the taxes as ballots
scheme reflected in the tax deduction for charitable contributions.
I have already alluded to the notion that a concern about collec-
tive action arising from a decisionmaker's need for information often
can be remedied at the cost of complexity. In this case, taxpayers
could be polled as to whether they would like to add $3 even if the
amount otherwise raised exceeds the previous year's (or some other)
total. These respondents might be informed of the amount raised in
previous years, so that each taxpayer could then record the amount
he would like to see budgeted in the present year, with his response
generating a $3 addition to the campaign fund if the amount "oth-
erwise" raised falls below his preferred budget.0 Inasmuch as we
shy away from comparable complexity in general elections, where
voters might similarly wish to make their votes for Senator X con-
tingent upon a particular result in other elections held that day, I
will assume that this sort of decision-tree thinking may motivate
legislative logrolls but is beyond the scope of direct democracy.3 '
However, the less complex the polling, and the less room there is for
contingent responses, the more likely that a coordination problem
will exist among respondents who are combining to set budgets.
Even if the coordination problem just described seems plausible,
the uncertainty at its roots may seem dwarfed by the public goods
problem in which it can be regarded as embedded. If a taxpayer is
willing to pay $3 when he enjoys but a tiny fraction (perhaps one
two-hundred millionth) of the benefit from public financing of cam-
paigns, then there is something to be said for the claim that this
good is vastly underprovided and that a typical a ative response
supports the public provision of a huge multiple of that privately
contributed amount. But this conventional argument regarding
"nonrival" goods is misplaced here, at least with respect to the fed-
eral system. Taxpayers are not asked to contribute directly from
See notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Perhaps we have stumbled on an interesting
explanation for the emergence of representative democracies and the move away from town
meetings and the like.
' A taxpayer who preferred the "group's" view on the matter could respond over a period
of years in proportion to the group's response rate. But this technical point makes the tax-
payer's marginal decision so insignificant compared to the cost of decisionmaking as to seem
sily.
sy Thus, there are arguments for single-transferable voting and cumulative voting schemes
in a variety of settings, but their complexity helps to account for the fact that these schemes
have not been widely adopted. See note 26.
2 In any case, individual behavior regarding nonrival goods is not entirely predictable.
Laboratory experiments undertaken to explore tendencies toward free-rider behavior have
exhibited mixed results. One such study suggests a relatively balanced mix between free-riding
and public-spirited behavior, contradicting the view that free-riding inevitably leads to zero
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their own pockets but rather are asked whether they would prefer
that $3 be allocated to the public campaign fund instead of another
unspecified federal program. In this other program, the single citi-
zen is again likely to receive but a tiny fraction of the good provided
to all. It is possible that a single taxpayer is a decent judge of
whether he prefers the "average" public use of $3 or its particular
allocation to this campaign financing program. Put slightly differ-
ently, the tax return's question is not posed as one of private sacri-
fice; the question is how the allocation decision generated through
the checkoff scheme compares to that offered through legislative de-
cisionmaking, bureaucratic determination, or even a referendum.
Further evidence that the coordination problem emphasized in
this Part is more important than the more general public goods
problem is presented by extending the discussion to situations
where affirmatively responding individuals do bear a modest cost,
as is the case with many state checkoffs.' If there are 100,000 visi-
tors to a museum, and 2,000 of them voluntarily contribute $100
each, we should not conclude that each donor is expressing a prefer-
ence for the museum's budget to be (governmentally subsidized up
to the level of) $10 million.' Instead, the typical donor may appreci-
ate the benefits of cooperation. Each would give nothing if she knew
she were the only donor; each $100 gift is part of a cooperative effort
among 2,000 persons who may well think that the museum's budget
should be about the amount raised ($200,000)."5 Similarly, the
or a trivial amount of public goods. On the other hand, more cynical expectations appear to be
borne out as laboratory researchers produce in their subjects a growing awareness of the po-
tential for free-riding. See Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 71 (Irwin 4th ed 1995).
See note 2.
The argument would be that to the extent that each donor is a representative visitor,
then the donor enjoys 1/100,000 of the return from what she gives. If the average gift is $100,
our best estimate of the total value of the museum in that period is $100 * 100,000 =
$10,000,000. Note that the large number of donors simply confirms a view that the average
donor is not idiosyncratic but rather represents the likely benefit obtained by each of(or the
average of) the 100,000 visitors. The example could thus be written with 2,000 diverse donors
whose median gift is $100.
"I hesitate to use the word "cooperative" because it is the redistributive motive that the
museum might wish to stress. A generous visitor might think that if the average cost of each
visit is $20, then this museum is a socially useful institution that she is happy to support. She
gives an extra $80, we might imagine, in order to subsidize the visits of four other persons who
cannot afford cultural ventures. An alternative view of the $100 contribution is that the donor
wishes to help the museum improve its collection; she and the museum's management may
aspire to make the average cost of a visit $40, and she gives more than that amount "on behalf"
of future visitors who cannot yet grasp the increased private benefit they will receive. Of
course, this example puts to the side the rationality of any individual's believing that she af-
fects the aggregate quality or character of the museum. See note 14.
Imagine now that the state responds to the $200,000 raised in private money by suggest-
ing that it reduce the public subsidy to this museum. A typical (and often sensible) reaction
to this proposed reduction is that it will discourage future donors; it takes the public goods
argument about nonrival goods and turns it on its head in an unattractive and destructive
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checkoff scheme can be seen as an opportunity for cooperation in
generating a public campaign fund. In both settings, however, er-
ratic fundraising histories can make each willing cooperator uncer-
tain about how to respond in order to generate the total budget pre-
ferred by that player.
It may be unnecessary to add that many taxpayers pay little at-
tention to their checkoff responses either because $3 is a small
amount, because their own net cost is close to zero, or simply be-
cause they cynically believe that the number of affirmative re-
sponses makes no difference inasmuch as Congress would find a dif-
ferent method of producing the same budget for presidential cam-
paigns. Nevertheless, I am inclined to find the scheme, and the re-
sponses to it, interesting. It can be taken as an opportunity to think
about collective action problems and proportional voting (as dis-
cussed presently) in a world in which the strategy embodied in the
checkoff scheme is extended to other matters and to much larger
budgetary allocations.
b) The temptation of proportional voting. Perhaps the most
interesting attribute of the checkoff scheme is that, because each
positive response adds the specified amount to the public allocation,
the checkoff produces a policy result-in this case an
appropriation-that is proportional to the electorate's enthusiasm. 6
A somewhat analogous election day procedure would provide that
each vote (or more realistically each percentage point of the vote) for
candidate A entitled A, if victorious, to hold office for some unit of
time. A winner with 60 percent of the popular vote might earn a
term that was one or two years longer than a winner with 50 percent
of the vote. 7
fashion. But the state's response to this outrage might be that it wanted the museum to be a
modest $20 experience, and that donors are simply increasing the quality of the museum when
in fact this is a museum that would do more social good by not aspiring to be more luxurious
and better equipped.
In the case of state universities, for example, this may be close to the position of many
state governments; tuition and service levels continue to rise, fueled in part by private funds,
and it is not unreasonable for the state to prefer that there be no continuing rise in the share
of gross national product attributable to elite education. University administrators might
respond to this claim by arguing that private donors are especially interested in the redistribu-
tive (rather than quality-increasing) potential of their gifts. But the spirit of these redistribu-
tive gifts- remains cooperative in the sense that each donor is part of the effort to create a
scholarship fund (or a fund capable of providing a museum even for those who cannot pay).
Each donor would likely cease to contribute if she knew that she would be the sole donor or
that her gift would lead to a reduction in public support.
Proportional decisionmaking of the kind sketched in the text enjoys no special link to
campaign finance questions. The more general topic is introduced and explored in Saul
Levmore, Three Kinds of Proportional Democracy (work in progress).
A more complex system could give equivalent bonuses to winners with substantial plu-
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The proportionality feature of the appropriation-by-checkoff is
one thing that makes this device as much a part of the world of taxes
as it is a part of the world of ballots. Tax credits and deductions
regularly yield results that are proportional to the level of taxpayer
response, while ballots nearly always involve up or down votes on
issues or candidates. 8
In short, it is tempting to think of the checkoff scheme as
emerging where it does because of the occasional attraction of pro-
portional voting. I have not, however, specified the nature of the at-
traction or the identity of the necessary admirers. Indeed, one prob-
lem with this explanation of the tax checkoff scheme is that some
further explanation will be required as to why other political deci-
sions also are not delegated to popular, proportional decisionmak-
ing. 9 Another problem is that any potential advantage of propor-
tionality, or of linking expenditures to the level of political support,
may be offset by its coercive, antimajoritarian possibilities.4 The
checkoff tool might increase the level of coercion associated with all
decisionmaking that is less than unanimous. It might also impose
greater "external costs" than conventional all-or-nothing voting.4
ralities in races with numerous candidates and could be sensitive to overall voter turnout as
well. It is almost disappointing that we do not find such systems in operation. A distant rela-
tive is the practice, used when filling multiple seats on a board for example, of allocating the
position of longest duration to the highest vote-getter, with inframarginal winners assigned
to other seats. These differentiated seats may arise as the product of resignations or of a
startup process in which lagged terms are instituted by electing some candidates to longer
terms than others.
A closer analogy is offered by parliamentary systems in which a party receives seats in
proportion to the number of votes it attracts. Runaway winners do not enjoy longer terms by
virtue of their support, but with more seats a party need not compromise as much with other
parties.
Put slightly differently, the checkoff scheme seems at first like a ballot communicated
through slips of paper that just happen to also contain individual tax returns. However, its
proportional decisionmaking character makes it unlike most ballots (and certainly unlike most
referenda) and much more like many other aspects of the tax system. Deductions and credits
quite generally lead to allocations that are a function of intensity or numbers rather than a
reflection of the median voter's preferences in all-or-nothing fashion.
I offer such an explanation in Part IV.
Readers who find majoritarian rule attractive because more opinions may lead to greater
accuracy will like the analogy to the literature on the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule,
which is also a kind of winner-takes-all rule where one need not be used. See Saul Levmore,
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J Legal Stud 691,697-98 (1990)
(discussing observation that, in cases of recurring interactions, the probabilistic rule will lead
to lower error costs than the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule); Neil Orloff and Jery
Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U
Pa L Rev 1159 (1983) (comparing the number, size, and distribution of errors under the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence and expected value rules).
" External costs" arise from the ability of a nonunanimous winning coalition to force oth-
ers to pay for public expenditures that disproportionately benefit the winning coalition. For
the classic exposition, see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
135-40 (Michigan 1962) (explaining how a system of majority voting can produce unattractive
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Modifying the earlier example, if 20 percent of taxpayers respond
affirmatively and cause a public expenditure of $200 million dollars,
it is plausible that a majority of respondents (not to mention citizens
more generally) prefer no public expenditure of this kind and now
find themselves paying for a minority's program. Affirmative re-
spondents are not, after all, paying these stuns out of their own
funds, for they are simply asked whether they would like to see
three more dollars of public funds allocated to the Presidential Elec-
tion Campaign Fund. The personal cost is thus the fraction of a cent
of value that might be enjoyed by some alternative public use of
these dollars. A conventional referendum or congressional vote
might well have yielded a zero expenditure, and it is easy to imagine
that an ideal referendum or legislative decision reflecting the pref-
erences of the median voter (in an all-or-nothing fashion), and per-
haps even taking intensity of preferences into account, would yield
a zero expenditure.
A third problem with the proportionality explanation is the
need for a plausible evolutionary story and the difficulty of identi-
fying a relevant set of admirers of proportional voting. It is difficult
to see why a majority coalition in the legislature would institute a
tool of proportional decisionmaking when it could simply vote con-
ventionally for the expenditure level it desires.42 Indeed, this per-
outcomes as majority coalitions form to extract resources from the minority).
If70 percent of the voters favor a very large appropriation while 30 percent favor zero,
the 70 percent can simply have their way, so they are unlikely to agree to a proportional rule
giving them only 70 percent of the appropriation they seek. And if70 percent want zero, and
30 percent want a large appropriation, then again the majority can get zero and would not
agree to a proportional rule appropriating 30 percent of what the minority prefers, for instance.
It is possible that ex ante a majority would agree to something with a proportional flavor but,
again, this requires either a kind of risk aversion or a sentiment that majorities are not more
likely to be "correct." Finally, a more technical way of expressing the point is that a legislative
majority is likely to find a Condorcet winner (one which defeats all competitors in head-to-head
competition) if one exists, whereas a proportional decisionmaking process--and certainly one
of the tax checkoffvariety-can easily miss such an outcome. See Saul Levmore, Bicameralism:
When are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 145, 147-51 (1992) (describing
voting behavior in a bicameral legislature); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Deci-
sionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va L Rev 971, 1018 (1989) ("The motion-and-
amendment procedure is one of the very few decisionmaking strategies that guarantees the
emergence of a Condorcet winner."). All these processes are discussed in Levmore, Three Kinds
of Proportional Democracy (cited in note 36).
A more general objection is that it is hard to see why a majority would vote for the checkoff
plan when it could easily lead to a result the majority dislikes because the coordination prob-
lem causes many respondents (who could form part of a legislative majority coalition in a con-
ventional vote) to respond in a way that proves inconsistent with their own preferences as to
the aggregate expenditure.
Finally, the point in the text about what a majority in the legislature would allow suggests
a similar question about the structure of checkoff schemes. Why would taxpayers and legisla-
tors not prefer that checkoffs funnel dollars to the political parties designated by respondents?
One answer is that a taxpayer may not know in one year which party he will prefer in the
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spective illuminates the complementary question of why propor-
tional decisionmaking is the exception rather than the rule. The
disinclination to employ superficially attractive proportional deci-
sionmaking may be explained by the fact that the attraction is in-
deed superficial; a majority of voters (or representatives with the
authority to vote on a matter) can always get their way if they hold
an all-or-nothing vote, so we should not expect members of a poten-
tial majority (which is by definition most voters) to give up their
authority and turn to proportional decisionmaking.
The puzzle that remains is why the checkoff idea is found pal-
atable in its limited domain. Without expanding the discussion to
proportional decisionmaking more generally, a reasonable answer
seems to be that elected representatives might find the subject of
publicly financed presidential campaigns a good one to delegate
away, both because the results matter little to these players and be-
cause they fear voter "dissatisfaction" with any budgetary allocation
emanating from the legislature." A cynical embellishment to this
conjecture is that the novelty of the checkoff scheme makes its
problems least obvious to voters, so that (at least for the present) it
is attractive to legislators who can claim to have allowed the people
to decide and obtain what they want. Over time, when this mecha-
nism is revealed as generating something that is inconsistent with
the preferences of a majority of voters, the elected delegators will
need tomove to another solution (or avoidance) mechanism. Alter-
natively, similar decisionmaking mechanisms might be proposed for
other budgetary questions, and then either the collective action
problems of checkoff schemes will be revealed, or elected representa-
tives will master the art of explaining why their constituents are
good at deciding some things but not others.44
coming election that is still several years away. A more general response is that taxpayers may
simply like the public campaign financing idea regardless of who wins.
By "dissatisfaction," I do not mean to suggest that the checkoff scheme yields a superior
result in terms associated with Pareto or Condorcet (or, through the empty core idea, with
both). However, it is certainly possible that a legislature that chose to delegate the question
of the funding level for publicly financed campaigns might well avoid the referendum mecha-
nism (were it somehow constitutionally available) because it would lead to dissatisfaction. See
Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 991-96 (cited in note 42) (explaining the relationship of cycling pref-
erences, Condorcet winners, and instability arising from "dissatisfaction7 when a majority
coalition sees that it could have defeated the prevailing coalition if procedural rules had been
different). The checkoff might uniquely avoid dissatisfaction, if only because it randomizes or
delegates the agenda-setting function.
Note that the legislators' own dissatisfaction might be evident only if the budget set by the
checkoff pertained to their own campaigns rather than to those of the presidential candidates.
" An analytically tidy-but almost surely incorrect-move to make at this point would be
to suggest that the public financing of presidential campaigns is among the least likely ques-
tions to generate an unambiguous majoritarian position. It is therefore noteworthy that pro-
portional decisionmaking is introduced precisely where this source of dissatisfaction with other
1998]
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3. Checkoffs as political expression.
I have suggested thus far that the checkoff scheme is an inter-
esting but flawed social choice mechanism, and I have ignored the
less complicated view that the checkoff option may aim to facilitate
political expression rather than collective choice regarding an ex-
penditure. Respondents who like the idea of public financing can
send that message by affirmatively responding to the checkoff ques-
tion; the symbolic dollar amount for individual reallocation is some-
what beside the point.45
The expressionist view would hardly explain the preference for
a checkoff rather than a referendum of some kind. Yet, as I will dis-
cuss in Part I.C,- many states employ the checkoff device even
though they, unlike the federal government, have the ready option
of a referendum.46 It is also difficult to see how an expressionist view
will explain why a full credit is used for funding publicly financed
election campaigns while a deduction is used for funding charitable
giving. The deduction would seem to disenfranchise unnecessarily
(or stifle the expressive potential of) nonitemizing taxpayers.
C. Costly Checkoffs
Colorado instituted a checkoff on its state income tax return for
the benefit of wildlife programs in 1977, five years after the federal
campaign financing scheme began. By 1996, every state with an in-
come tax had some form of checkoff.47 State checkoff programs fund
forms of majority decisionmaking is most obvious to the legislature. In fact, however, majority
decisionmaking may be more problematic in situations where cyclical or multiple-peaked pref-
erences are likely. One such situation, the decision regarding the appropriate level of foreign
aid appropriations, is discussed in Part IV. Most voters who prefer $X to be allocated to the
cause of publicly financed election campaigns will be increasingly displeased with the distance
from $Y_ Such single-peaked preferences yield coherent majority decisionmaking. Levmore, 75
Va L Rev at 987 & n 47 (cited in note 42). In contrast it is likely that line-by-line allocations
in a foreign aid bill affect sentiments as to its overall size. Furthermore, voters who prefer that
SX be appropriated might well think that $0 is better than $.5X or that $.5X is better than
$.75X because of the indivisibilities associated with some foreign aid programs. In any event,
inasmuch as my aim here is to explore the idea of taxes as ballots and not to defend or even
explain the nearly unique presence of the presidential checkoff scheme, there is no need to
exhaust these questions.
' There is however the question of how to set the overall budget. If respondents are per-
ceived as enthusiastic, Congress can appropriate additional (or even matching) public funds.
The expressionist view is problematic when extended to the more general topic of taxes as
ballots because it suggests the cynical approach that all balloting can be understood as serving
an expressive rather than a more direct social choice function. The first paradox of voting,
namely why people vote at all, might simply be resolved with the idea that voters are like
graffitists and authors of letters to newspaper editors; it does not seem mysterious that some
people participate while others decline such opportunities to be heard.
4' See note 22.
' See Checkoff, Tax Administrators News at 17 (cited in note 14).
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campaign financing, but they also embrace numerous nonpolitical
causes, including education, medical research, Olympic sports, mili-
tary memorials, and especially wildlife programs.' Unlike the fed-
eral checkoff, all of the nonpolitical state checkoffs-and some of
those designated for political campaign financing-ask the taxpayer
not to reallocate public funds but to contribute out of the refund
check the taxpayer would otherwise receive." The offer made to tax-
payers in these state tax returns is thus little more than a state-
sponsored fundraising campaign; in some cases, the state even
charges for its administrative efforts. 50
State checkoff schemes are sometimes used to fund politically
sensitive causes, such as AIDS research, aid for the homeless, or
arts funding.5 ' These examples suggest the point raised in Part
I.B.2.b, that legislative delegation, or outsourcing to a populist
mechanism that creates no absolute winners and losers, might be
explained by representatives' desire to avoid decisionmaking that
will lead to inevitable voter dissatisfaction.
In those systems where the state is little more than an interme-
diary, transferring funds from the pockets of affirmative respondents
to a variety of causes, the potential collective action problem that
makes the federal plan for funding presidential campaigns espe-
cially interesting is more remote. Admittedly, taxpayers who file
' See id. One of the interesting things about the state programs is the way they have imi-
tated one another. A checkofffor non-game wildlife is omnipresent, even though this is not a
cause that does particularly well in the legislative process itself. Another interesting feature
is the nondeductibility of the amounts contributed through these state programs (even though
they involve a net cost to the responding taxpayer). Nondeductibility may have seemed natural
when checkoffs involved political campaign funds, since direct contributions to candidates and
parties are also nondeductible, but it is notable that there developed no move to encourage
other checkoffs with the usual incentive of the tax deduction. Itemizers and serious contribu-
tors can be expected to contribute directly and to let the checkoff opportunities pass by. On the
other hand, we might expect federal checkoffs for new causes to mimic the state programs,
appealing to small, nonitemizing contributors. Causes such as space exploration and arts pro-
grams come to mind, if the checkoffs could be marketed as supplementing direct allocations
by Congress and by itemizing donors.
' Indeed, it is possible that many taxpayers are misled by the federal model into thinking
that the state checkoff similarly involves no net cost to the individual. On the other hand, the
rate of affirmative responses is fairly low and generally declining. The highest rate of affirma-
tive participation in a nonpolitical checkoff scheme is the 4.13 percent rate generated by Min-
nesota's non-game wildlife program, but half elicit less than 1 percent participation. The high-
est rate for a state political checkoff (at no net cost to the taxpayer) is Hawaii's 26.4 percent,
but most fall well below the federal response rate of 13 percent. Id at 21.
' Some states deduct an amount for reasonable administrative costs before forwarding
contributions to the designated causes. See State Tax Rev 10 (CCH May 19, 1997) (describing
Pennsylvania's approach to this problem).
1 See Conn Gen Stat Ann § 12-743 (West 1993 & 1996 Supp) (AIDS research); La Rev Stat
Ann § 46:591-92 (West 1982 & 1997 Supp) (Homeless Trust Fund); Va Code § 9-84.09 (1993
& 1997 Supp) (Virginia Arts Foundation Fund). See generally Checkoff, Tax Administrators
News at 17, 21 (cited in note 14).
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state returns might wish they could divine the behavior of fellow
respondents, because an individual's inclination to contribute to a
fund might rise or fall depending on the amount of money otherwise
contained in, or raised by, this fund. On the other hand, if these
causes enjoy other sources of funding, then by the time taxpayers
file their state returns, sufficient information may be available to
allow many respondents to assess whether their own preferences
regarding the level of support for a given cause call for a further con-
tribution.2
II. BALLOTING THROUGH THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
A. The Charitable Deduction as a Social Choice Mechanism
Readers familiar with the vast literature on the charitable de-
duction, and on the associated exemption from income tax available
to organizations that are on the receiving end of contributions,53 may
have encountered hints of the idea that the tax system can be seen
as allowing taxpayers individually to allocate federal money to wor-
thy causes.' The taxes as ballots idea has its origin in these earlier
52 Other taxpayers who favor that cause will prefer to make direct charitable contributions,
not only because of the available tax deduction, but also because one can choose to make a
charitable gift early in the year when it might send a useful signal to other potential donors,
or later in the year, if the donor's own decisionmaking would be improved by the availability
of additional information regarding the charity's fundraising (including revenues from the
state's tax-return-as-fundraiser option). The role of information about other gift-giving is ex-
plored more fully in Part III.B.
' See 26 USC §§ 170, 501 (1994) (Section 170 allows taxpayers to deduct charitable con-
tributions up to 50 percent of the taxpayer's contribution base for the year, Section 501 ex-
empts corporations and organizations devoted exclusively to charitable purposes from taxa-
tion.).
5' This literature focuses on the tax deduction as promoting a kind of pluralism, although
there are occasional suggestions that this pluralism is greater than that which would be pro-
duced through legislative decisionmaking. The public choice perspective-that a deduction may
aggregate preferences in a way that is superior to conventional voting or referenda-is entirely
absent. Much of the work linking the deduction to pluralism goes on to argue that an explicit
matching-grant (or credit) scheme, perhaps progressive in structure, would improve the plu-
ralistic character of the system because nonitemizers would be given a voice, because low-
bracket taxpayers would be as empowered as high-bracket taxpayers, because donors whose
contributions were modest in absolute terms but quite impressive in relative, or wealth-
corrected, terms could gain influence as well, and because private giving in the aggregate
would be encouraged by empowering modest donors. Notable works include Boris I. Bittker,
Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L Rev 37 (1972) (de-
fending the equity of deductions, criticizing matching-grant proposals as constitutionally and
politically unworkable as well as overly intrusive, and suggesting reforms in the deduction-
based system); Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving (Chicago 1985)
(presenting econometric evidence, including empirical data and computer simulations, bearing
on tax policy toward charitable contributions); Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to the Theory
of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Charitable Giving, in Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin,
eds, The Economics of Taxation 99, 105 n 13 (Brookings 1980) (citing econometric studies that
indicate, contra Vickrey and others, that the price elasticity of charitable contributions is
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suggestions. The charitable deduction makes the government a
partner in every gift-giving venture; a taxpayer in the (hypothetical
but arithmetically convenient) 50 percent bracket, for instance, can
be seen as joining forces with the government to give equal amounts
to the cause chosen by the taxpayer (with characteristics or mini-
mum qualifications set by the government).55 Hence each individual
taxpayer's choice, deduction, or "ballot," not only reflects a private
contribution but also triggers a matching government contribution
in the form of a reimbursement of part of the taxpayer-donor's gift.
The government may of course choose to increase its support with
direct grants beyond the amounts generated by the matching
scheme.
An obvious objection to the use of the charitable deduction as a
social choice mechanism to determine government spending is that
many citizens effectively are disenfranchised because they need not
file returns or do not benefit from itemizing their deductions. An-
other familiar objection in slightly new clothing is that because
higher bracket taxpayers are given more reason to "vote," and
wealthier taxpayers can afford more votes, there is distasteful devia-
tion from the one-person-one-vote ideal. It is as if the charitable de-
greater than one, which is to say that contributions generated by the deduction add more reve-
nue to charities than is lost by the Treasury); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Con-
tributions Deduction, 74 Va L Rev 1393 (1988) (reviewing various theories supporting a deduc-
tion or credit and concluding that a deduction is both equitable and Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but
that many currently tax-exempt charities should be excluded); Harold M. Hochman and James
D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30 Natl Tax J 1 (1977),
reprinted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed, The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions 224 (Oxford
1986) (using the theory of public goods to argue that charitable subsidies are Pareto efficient
and that the current deduction system should be replaced by a flat-rate tax credit); Paul R.
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income
Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L Rev 377, 390-92, 396-99 (1972) (arguing that the pluralistic character
of the deduction is severely compromised by its favoritism toward higher-bracket taxpayers,
and proposing a replacement system of proportional matching grants); Paul R. McDaniel,
Study of Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions, in Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, 4 Research Papers 2417 (US Dept of the Treasury 1977) (ex-
anining federal matching grants as a substitute for current tax deductions for charitable con-
tributions, and discussing the effects of such a change on both donors and donees); Jeff Strnad,
The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in Rose-Ackerman, ed,
The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions 265, 266-67 (criticizing Hochman and Rodgers and
arguing that the charitable deduction is a Pareto-improving political bargain); William Vick-
rey, Private Philanthropy and Public Finance, in Edmund S. Phelps, ed, Altruism, Morality,
and Economic Theory 149, 152-53, 158-59 (Russell Sage 1975) (criticizing the deduction as
introducing unanticipated and economically perverse effects and suggesting the possibility of
a credit or matching-grant program). Some empirical data and a good discussion of the ex-
planatory power of various models of"diffuse decisionmaking" can be found in Alan L. Feld,
Michael O'Hare, and J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Patrons Despite Themselves: Taxpayers and
Arts Policy 104-29 (NYU 1983).
' I will ignore the various incentives associated with the (somewhat constrained) ability
to contribute appreciated property and obtain a deduction for the full value of the property
without recognizing gain on the previously untaxed appreciation. See 26 USC § 170(b), (e).
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duction institutes something of a poll tax, because one can only
"vote," and thus influence the allocation of these government
matching funds, by paying some "fee." These objections may be over-
come for some by the substantial "voter turnout" that is induced by
the tax deduction scheme, and by the fact that the government may
need all the help it can get in monitoring and choosing among hospi-
tals, schools, social welfare agencies, and the like. Another argument
in favor of the deduction approach as compared to the alternative of
direct government grants is that it may induce citizens not only to
choose for themselves where to apply personal and government
funds, but also to develop a sense of commitment to the chosen
charities. Thus, they become involved individually as volunteers in
ways that they would not if their tax money were simply allocated
to the charities by the legislature or by government bureaucrats. It
is also plausible that citizens tolerate greater redistribution or
spending on public goods when they take the lead in identifying the
objects of government (and personal) munificence than they would
if the government simply collected taxes and spent money directly
on similar causes. It may be that a majority of voters or legislators
supports increased redistribution, and that this majority chooses the
tax deduction scheme as a superior mechanism for achieving that
long-term goal. 6 The redistribution strategy can even be thought of
as a precommitment device by a majority that knows that when left
to its private devices it is not so mean-spirited after all.
It is not terribly puzzling, I think, that even as the legislature
(arguably) delegates funding decisions in this manner,57 it also
"Admittedly, the assertion that such an altruistic spirit may govern here is not unprob-
lematic. Empathic behavior, because of its facially nonegoistic character, poses difficulties of
explanation for evolutionary biologists, economists, psychologists, and philosophers alike; the
literature is accordingly vast. The debate, however, as to whether the underlying motivation
for such behavior is actually altruistic or egoistic at its root does not controvert the existence
of the empathic responses themselves. See C. Daniel Batson, Jim Fultz, and Patricia A. Scho-
enrade, Adults'Emotional Reactions to the Distress of Others, in Nancy Eisenberg and Janet
Strayer, eds, Empathy and Its Development 163, 164-65, 180-81 (Cambridge 1987) (describing
empathic reactions and noting that "[wihether the motivation to help associated with empathy
is altruistic or simply a different form of egoistic motivation is not at present clear"). A recent
interdisciplinary overview of the problem is Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism:
Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton 1996). The psychological literature and its
various proposed models are canvassed by David A. Schroeder, et al, The Psychology of Helping
and Altruism: Problems and Puzzles (McGraw-Hill 1995). See also Amartya K Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 Phil & Pub Affairs 317,
329 (1977) (arguing that commitment "drives a wedge between personal choice and personal
welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on the identity of the two").
" Some readers might identify the principal actor to be the voters, while others will prefer
to think of the government as an independent entity, barely responsible to anyone. The argu-
ment can be adapted accordingly. In any event, the "legislature" is best taken as referring to
Congress, inasmuch as state legislatures have administrative reasons 'for piggybacking on the
federal tax system and its decisions as to what ought to be deductible. It is possible, I suppose,
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makes direct allocations to an overlapping set of recipients. For ex-
ample, direct support of a university's programs alongside matching
grants in the form of deductions on the tax returns of private donors
to the same university can be understood in a variety of ways. The
government may buy or encourage some activities and services, such
as particular kinds of research, either because the university is an
efficient provider, because interest group pressures or legislators'
tastes generate such expenditures, or because the government
chooses to follow the lead of private donors and to do more than
match those donations through deductions. It is also possible that
with regard to the wisdom of certain contributions there is reason to
have great faith in the information and expertise available to cen-
tralized decisionmakers. Finally, and perhaps most practically, the
tax deduction scheme leaves decisionmaking largely in the hands of
a set of taxpayers, and the government may wish to encourage par-
ticular programs that these (otherwise trusted and encouraged) de-
cisionmakers would be unlikely to identify on their own. For exam-
ple, direct government grants to universities are rarely unrestricted.
If one becomes caught up in the spirit of the taxes as ballots
idea, a variety of subsidies and tax deductions begin to fit the de-
scription of delegations from the legislature to the "voters." For ex-
ample, the interest deduction available to investors and homeown-
ers, not to mention the income tax itself, with its taxing of profits
and deductions for losses, establishes the government as a kind of
partner that allows private actors to decide on the location and de-
tails of investments. Other governments, in contrast, are more in-
clined to make investment decisions centrally after collecting the
necessary funds through higher tax rates, much as other govern-
ments offer no charitable deduction in their income tax systems but
engage in more centrally organized social welfare programs.5" Al-
though one can find examples of the taxes as ballots idea every-
where, many of these examples have sensible conventional explana-
that a state constitution with stronger language regarding separation of church and state than
the federal Constitution could lead a state court to insist that deductions taken on the federal
return for contributions to religious organizations be added back to income on that state's
income tax returns.
5 For some other examples of centralization versus delegation, or partially finded privati-
zation, if it can be called that, see Part IV. To expand the point in the text, one might argue
that it is no accident that the same tax system that offers the charitable deduction also offers
a child care credit and contemplates tuition tax credits and, elsewhere in the regulatory sys-
tem, school voucher programs.
Note that although I use the term delegation here, because deductible contributions often
go to organizations that Congress also subsidizes directly, there is less delegation in the chari-
table deduction context than in the checkoff and (perhaps) home construction (interest rate)
examples. It is therefore possible that the delegation is cosmetic-with Congress increasing
its direct outlay if private (matched) giving falls short of expectations.
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tions that make the taxes as ballots understanding less central. 9 I
therefore do not broaden the scope of the present Article in this
manner.
Public-choice minded readers with a pessimistic bent may be in-
clined to think of Congress as delegating allocational decisionmak-
ing whenever this outsourcing benefits its members by increasing
rent-seeking activity. It is arguable, for example, that the charitable
deduction is palatable to Congress both because most of the benefi-
ciary organizations, unlike profit-oriented firms that often seek gov-
ernment favors through lavish expenditures, would be frugal suppli-
cants, and because legislators would have more to lose from favoring
some organizations or causes over others than they would gain from
such favoritism. The optimistic alternative is that the charitable
deduction can be viewed as a precommitment by, Congress to refrain
from exercising power (and encouraging rent-seeking) where it
might have.0 The problem with the optimistic version is that it fails
to explain why and where Congress gives up opportunities; many
deductions could be withdrawn and many spending programs could
be delegated through deductions. But the claim associated with the
pessimistic view, that Senators and Representatives would be worse
off from the perspective of their own selfish interests if Congress
were more directly involved in funding social welfare and religious
organizations and the like, while Congress is somehow better off
using direct grants in other industries, is not entirely convincing,
because where there are strong sentiments there are normally op-
portunities for extracting political contributions. In any event, my
aim in this Article is merely to explore the possibility of taxes as
ballots, not to insist on a single correct view of the checkoff and the
deductions that I have placed under investigation. I return to the
question of congressional self-interest in Part IV.
B. Balloting and the Checkoff Alternative to the Deduction
1. Advantages of the deduction.
But why deductions rather than credits-and, in particular,
why the deduction approach to charities and the checkoff scheme for
59 The interest deduction, for example, is necessary to avoid marringincome measurement
and efficiency of inputs. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest
Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 Vill L Rev 1461, 1510 n 190 (1993)
(demonstrating how the personal deduction for interest paid on business debts ensures an
accurate measure of taxable income). The income tax itself, aside from serving as a vehicle for
delegation of decisionmaking, is of course justified primarily as a means of raising revenue
that compares favorably with alternative strategies.
' See Gordon Tullock, The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking 81 (Kuwer
1989).
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financing campaigns? The choice between deductions and credits is
available to lawmakers in every corner of the tax code, and there is
no reason to think that the taxes as ballots idea needs to provide a
master key to understanding this recurring question. Nevertheless,
the relative capacities of deductions and credits to facilitate collec-
tive choice are useful to compare. The most straightforward com-
parison is between a deduction and a full, or 100 percent, credit, as
was more or less encountered in the checkoff system described in
Part I.A.5 ' The immediate question, therefore, is what are the rela-
tive advantages of the two proportional decisionmaking schemes
that we have examined?62
I have suggested already that the campaign financing checkoff
is a seriously flawed balloting procedure, both because respondents
are not really offered the opportunity to express their views as to the
aggregate level of government spending and because the aggrega-
tion of responses is unlikely to reflect much more than a collage of
private guesswork. I also have suggested that these imperfections
may not much trouble the legislators who have put this system in
place. The checkoff scheme may be explained best as delegation
sinking to the level of abdication.
In contrast, as a matter of gathering information about majori-
tarian or other preferences, the charitable deduction may be a rela-
tively clever tool, and a comparison with the full credit quality of the
campaign checkoff scheme may provide the means to appreciate the
deduction. Imagine a system that encouraged charitable giving and
helped the government allocate funds to and among charities by of-
fering taxpayers a full credit for all qualified gifts or for gifts up to
some amount per taxpayer.6 This sort of costless vote to direct gov-
ernment funds to a particular qualified recipient would run the risk
of potential recipients buying these votes." Much as politicians
61 The checkoff option is different from a tax credit in that it does not reduce a taxpayer's
liability. A full credit would allow respondents with a positive tax liability to influence the
allocation of public funds in a personally beneficial way, while the checkoff scheme allows filers
to do so in a costless but nonbeneficial manner.
' Of course, an unsatisfactory answer might lead us to conclude that it is misleading to
try to understand the two schemes as balloting endeavors. Note that although I refer to the
credit and deduction schemes as proportional, because they are not all-or-nothing in the man-
ner of so many majoritarian legislative decisions, there is no guarantee that they will yield
results that are actually any more "proportional" with respect to voters' preferences than
would legislative or other compromises.
' Under this system, the taxpayer would donate to a charity, and then at the end of the
tax year, receive full credit for this gift. See note 67.
We can imagine either a virtually limitless credit, just as most taxpayers can now take
deductions for all their charitable gifts, or a limited credit. Thus, every taxpayer might be in
a position to allocate $500, because tax law would provide a full credit for that amount, and
further contributions to qualified recipients would yield a deduction or lesser credit-or even
a progressive credit or matching grant. See note 54. In any event, charities might compete for
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sometimes seek to buy votes from registered voters,65 charities might
buy the tax-credited transfers from "donors." Charities would be in
a significantly better position than are politicians to contract in this
manner, even assuming comparable reputational and criminal de-
terrents. Politicians are hampered by the secret ballot, but charities
could be certain that colluding donors had done their part. A donor
might fail to file for the credit either because of neglect or because
he had already exhausted the available credit, but neither of these
possibilities is of concern to the charity.67 In sum, one problem with
costless votes in the form of full credits for charitable donations is
that charities might compete too vigorously for these funds." This
competition would greatly reduce the likelihood of either extracting
the first $500 from each taxpayer, and some charities might pay for this allocation.
"On6 recent scandal involved the sale of votes in a local election at prices ranging from
$20 to $60 each. See Bill Osinski, Dodge County: A Legacy of Lawlessness; Seedy Side of Poli-
tics, Atlanta J & Const 4B (July 6,1997) (describing a Democratic primary for county commis-
sion that became "a bargain-basement sellout of the democratic process"). I will not dwell on
the question of how it could be nearly irrational to vote but also rational to pay so much for
votes; in this particular case of corruption, up to one-third of the votes were said to have been
influenced by monetary inducements. Id. In theory, if vote buying is socially bad, then it ought
to be the case that in a fully functioning market citizens would value their votes more than
corrupt politicians do, and the majority would pay outlaw citizens not to sell their votes to
selfish politicians. After all, corrupt policies should be inferior to socially responsive actions
(or inaction). But the market for voters, or their tax-credited contributions, would not neces-
sarily favor the most worthwhile charities, because the very nature of these charities is to
redistribute wealth or undertake projects that involve public goods or other market failures.
In contrast, the current campaign financing checkoff runs an especially low risk of en-
couraging bribes, both because the actual responses are difficult to verify, and because no
single candidate or even political party gains more than $1.50 per respondent. In effect, the
transaction costs of bribery regarding this checkoff are prohibitive.
' These possibilities would of course be quite important to the charity if the system were
structured so that the Treasury paid money to the charity only after the taxpayer "checked-off'
that charity on her tax return. However, a charitable contribution credit would be unlikely to
have such a structure, because this sort of exercise in direct democracy would have two signifi-
cant disadvantages: it would require charities to wait until year's end for funds, and it would
generate significant administrative costs for the government, since funds would be distributed
to a large number of charities, unlike the small number of recipients of campaign finance
funding. Consequently, it is a fairly safe assumption that a charitable credit system would
have respondents contribute to charities directly, and then file for the credit. Under such a
system, the charities that had bribed taxpayers would have their money in hand, so they would
have no reason to care whether any taxpayer actually filed the credit, although any charity
would of course fear detection of their bribe.
'If the system were structured as a checkoff or a write-in in which the government made
payment to the charity only after the taxpayer claimed the credit on the charity's behalf, this
problem would be lessened somewhat. A charity would hesitate to pay $300 for the taxpayer's
promise to write in that charity's name as the recipient of a government grant of $500. The
promisee might ask to see a copy of the tax return, but originals could always be altered after
copying, and the very process of receiving another's return raises the prospect of criminal
prosecution-assuming that such bargaining or payment by a charity is criminalized. (I can
imagine a free-market mood swing in which reputational interests alone were allowed to con-
trol this matter, but the problem is that the allocational feature of the credit would likely be
eviscerated as charities compete for these government funds.)
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information about respondents' true preferences or encouraging in-
dividual involvement in (or monitoring of) charitable works.
A second, and perhaps less interesting, argument is that voters
might take their votes more seriously when required to pay for
them. Respondents might well think more carefully about allocating
government funds (in the form of the matching function played by
the charitable deduction) when there is a personal net cost than
when there is not (as would be the case with a full credit, a checkoff
among candidate charities, or a more conventional referendum). We
might, for example, think of law school graduates who are solicited
for contributions by the colleges and law schools they attended. It is
quite plausible that in responding with money, these voters contem-
plate the relative qualities and efficiencies of these institutions more
carefully than they would if simply asked by the government to vote
or advise on the allocation of public funds for higher education.
A further advantage of the charitable deduction returns us to
the collective action problem that may be associated with aggregat-ing preferences in order to determine an expenditure level.69 The
charitable deduction scheme permits a kind of ongoing vote. If a do-
nor's decision as to how to allocate his own funds, and therefore the
government's as well, depends on other contributors' decisions, then
this uncertain donor can receive information regarding charities'
receipts as the year progresses. In fact, the conventional explana-
tions for the spurt of charitable giving in December, that taxpayers
earn deductions most efficiently with this timing70 or that they are
poor planners but take the expiration of the tax year as a reminder
to give and earn deductions, may miss the fact that (for the same
deduction value) waiting until year's end provides the opportunity
for more informed decisionmaking.7 Correspondingly, some chari-
ties appeal to a certain subset of donors by stressing their dire needs
' Note that the problem described in the text may yield a Condorcet winner with conven-
tional voting because preferences can be single-peaked. The problem, as described in Part
I.B.2.a, arises because some voters prefer an intermediate expenditure rather than always
more or always less money spent.
" One conventional argument is that the artificial nature of the tax reporting year allows
donors to enjoy their money all year, part with it at the last minute, and then receive a deduc-
tion as if the gift were given in the "middle" of the year. The argument has some flaws, but
rings true to the Haig-Simons-minded reader or to one who simply insists that taxpayers have
more control over deductible expenditures that do not produce matching income for some re-
cipients than they do over the timing of income.
On the other hand, as an empirical matter, many charities remind us of the opportunity
to give at year's end, but most do not provide last minute updates about their receipts from
other contributors or other sources. And if there is as much uncertainty about what a charity
will raise as there is regarding the yield from the campaign checkoff scheme, then the collec-
tive action problem is identical, unless the donor-taxpayer can adjust better in the charity case
because contributions in subsequent years are not limited to $3.
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as the year goes on, while others appeal to a different subset by ad-
vertising their successes and encouraging potential donors to board
the bandwagon toward "excellence" or "making a real difference."
2. Information gathering prior to contributing or
other balloting.
This distinction between the charitable deduction and more
conventional ballots-or even less conventional checkoffs-need not
be as stark as I have implied. We could imitate the ongoing nature
of the deduction by turning election day into election month and re-
porting votes received on a daily or weekly basis. 2 And we could
have more checkoffs (or full tax credits) and report those results as
returns are filed. Some voters and fliers would respond early in or-
der to encourage others to do the same ("See, our cause is not a
loser."), while others would wait in order to vote with fuller informa-
tion. Some readers may recognize an obscure analogy to the source
of single-transferable-vote decisionmaking, in which school children
lined up behind candidates, deciding whether to run to the front and
form a new line or to hang back and move among established lines
in order to maximize the value of one's vote.73 But given our institu-
tional norms and the costs of altering them, we normally compare
institutions as they are presently constituted. I think it is therefore
fair to say that where we think that voters prefer, or perform better
with, more information regarding the marginal worth of their votes
than is available through preelection surveys and the like, ongoing
deductions may be superior to conventional balloting.
The preceding claim about taxes as drawn-out ballots able to
capture the value of developing information may be overly optimis-
tic. Consider, for example, one of the best examples of a collective
action problem that might have been solved with a switch from con-
ventional election day voting to a drawn-out process with ongoing
disclosure. In the 1980 presidential election some voters were said
to have "wasted" their votes on John Anderson, even though it was
clear that only Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had a chance to
win, because they liked the idea of enabling Anderson to poll the 5
percent required in order to collect funds from the Federal Election
Commission. Even if we count this 5 percent as not wasted, Ander-
son polled about 7 percent so that 2 percent of the votes (or two-
sevenths of each vote cast by 7 percent of the voters) might be re-
Note that the modem experiments with extended voting periods do not provide for re-
porting of vote totals before the last election day. See Rosenfield, Early Voting at 37-38 (cited
in note 19), citing Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, and Texas rules.
' For some discussion and sources, see Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 1037 n 171 (cited in note
i ne universuty or uncago Law aevew
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garded as wasted. An ongoing tally of the votes could have reduced
the problem because citizens who were most eager to fund Anderson,
or most supportive of the financing principle, or most indifferent be-
tween the other two candidates, could have voted early in order to
free other voters to cast marginally useful ballots.74
But even this example works in favor of unconventional ballot-
ing only with heroic assumptions. If, as seems likely, most voters
who wished for Anderson to receive funding had a definite opinion
as between the other candidates and had no reason to prefer their
fellow Anderson supporters over other voters, then there would be
no rush to liberate the 2 percent. Only a complicated ballot of the
transferable vote variety could do the job, and even that could be
seriously flawed.75 Moreover, it may be unreasonable to regard 2
percent waste as much of an indictment. This small margin of "er-
ror" might be taken to illustrate the fact that pre-election day sur-
veys provide enough information to make ongoing disclosure (with
conventional balloting or tax deduction schemes) unnecessary. If
charities did not try to stimulate giving with interim reports, it may
well be that they would still generate annual totals very close to the
amounts they receive at present. Having said this, I will now set it
aside, returning to my analytically defensible intuition that one ad-
vantage of balloting through charitable donations (as precursors to
later deductions) is a reduction in the collective choice problem asso-
ciated with appropriating funds through either a conventional
popular ballot or a checkoff device. This form of balloting through
the tax system is likely to be a superior collective choice procedure.
There is no need to dwell on the possibility of capitalizing the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund by asking citizens throughout
the year for contributions that can later be taken as full credits (of
up to $3) on the annual tax return.76 This strategy is superficially
appealing because not only does it mimic current law, but also it
would improve upon it as a collective choice mechanism by offering
the possibility of earlier creditable contributions that could be dis-
closed to the public in a way that informs those whose decisions de-
pend on the total amount likely to be raised. However, the transac-
tion costs do not seem worth the candle.
' The Anderson supporters might be thought of as attaching greater value to the prefer-
ences of their fellow Anderson supporters, in choosing between the two major party candidates,
than to the preferences of other voters. For a discussion of the Anderson race, see Warren
Weaver, Jr., Anderson Says He Feels No Bitterness and that He Might Consider 1984 Run, NY
Times A27 (Nov 6, 1980).
7' See Levmore, 75 Va L Rev at 1036-38 nn 171-74 (cited in note 42).
7, A credit system could offer a checkoff response on the annual tax return as a means of
enabling respondents to link their contributions and credits in instantaneous last-minute
fashion.
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C. Rethinking the Charitable Deduction: Balloting, Partial
Credits, and Floors
1. Alternatives to the charitable deduction.
Students of tax policy are familiar with the choice between de-
ductions and equivalent partial credits; in most cases, a less-than-
full credit can be offered as a perfect substitute for a tax deduction.
Thus, a taxpayer who itemizes deductions and who is subject to a
marginal tax rate of 50 percent is indifferent between the present
charitable deduction and a 50 percent credit. The substitution can
be perfected through decisions about the refundability of credits, the
need to itemize in order to enjoy deductions, and so forth. For the
system as a whole, the most important difference arises from the
fact that while deductions are worth more to those in higher brack-
ets, the terms of credits are invariant across brackets. Roughly
speaking, deductions seem superior when they are offered in order
to perfect the measurement of income. But if instead the aim is to
encourage or reward some behavior, then a credit might seem pref-
erable because it is hard to defend systematically greater rewards
to those with higher incomes, which is what a deduction would offer.
Thus, extraordinary medical expenses are deducted rather than
credited because the system is measuring income by attempting to
ascertain one's ability to pay taxes after medical expenses have been
paid, rather than encouriging taxpayers to incur medical expenses.77
On the other hand, the encouragement-measurement distinc-
tion fails to predict the deductibility of mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes attributable to homeowning.5 In these examples, there is
a deduction rather than a partial credit even though the point seems
to be to encourage home ownership, not to measure income accu-
rately. Indeed, as every student of tax law quickly learns, these
7 See 26 USC § 213 (1994). For the classic debate, compare William D. Andrews,Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv L Rev 309,330-37 (1972) (emphasizing that taxes
should be a function of well-being and that a deduction for medical expenses, which are an
intermediate good used to restore good health, is thus consistent with the idea of attempting
to apportion tax burdens according to aggregate personal consumption and accumulation of
goods and services), with Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly
in an 'Ideal"Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan L Rev
831, 865-68 (1979) (observing that personal medical expenditures are likely to reflect differ-
ences in personal consumption patterns). More recent work has drawn attention to baseline
and moral hazard problems, which might on their own drive the case for or against deductions
or credits. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40
Hastings L J 343,385-94 (1989) (presenting a Rawlsian analysis of distributive-justice impli-
cations of deductions); Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and
Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 Cal L Rev
1485, 1495-99, 1504-05 (1991) (presenting an analysis of deductions as implicit insurance
systems, and discussing the moral hazard problems they create).
' See 26 USC § 163(h) (1994).
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homeowners' deductions do not fare well in the normatively minded
tax policy literature.79
The deduction for charitable giving occupies something of a
middle ground. On one hand, it surely represents an attempt to en-
courage contributions, so that a credit would be defensible.0 On the
other hand, there is an argument that a deduction is more appropri-
ate, because the system may seek to measure income after the pay-
ment of charitable contributions (and even medical expenses81) and
not before. However, the availability of the deduction for contribu-
tions to religious organizations-including payments for church
pews and dues-is a bit difficult to rationalize. Indeed, one explana-
tion for the use of a charitable deduction rather than a partial credit
may be that it is politic to deploy the tax policy tool consistent with
income measurement rather than that which is normally associated
with explicit subsidies and encouragement in order to support the
legal claim that there is no constitutional difficulty with extending
favorable tax treatment to these religion-oriented contributions. 2
See, for example, Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation: A Law Student's
Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts 174-79 (Foundation 8th ed 1997). As already noted,
there is some room here for an aggressive application of the taxes as ballots idea, because
homeowners play a role in allocating construction and urban planning resources that might
otherwise have been centrally collected and disbursed. See text accompanying note 58.
I will not try to argue that the wealthy need greater incentives. Moreover, my discussion
is anything but exhaustive, avoiding the large and sometimes subtle literature that has
emerged on justifiable deductions and credits.
8 See note 77 and accompanying text.
An alternative explanation is that money given to churches that is used to help the poor
ought to be deductible (or credited), and that a system that distinguished between these mon-
ies and those going to church building and support would require auditing and an uncomfort-
able level of government intrusion. More generally, one might ask what the taxes as ballots
idea contributes to the question of which organizations ought to enjoy tax-exempt status, and
especially the gains from generating tax deductions for donors. Again, personal religious deci-
sions do not fare well under this view unless we rely on our disinclination to audit and sepa-
rate the religious and social welfare functions of religious organizations. Similarly, there is
ample room to wonder about the continued deductibility of contributions for which the donor
receives a benefit, such as a church pew. The taxes as ballots view does not support deductibil-
ity in such instances, but the future of Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") rulings and other law
in this area may be to continue to allow some such deductions in order to avoid any govern-
ment intrusions into the financing patterns of mainstream religions. Thus far, courts have
endorsed the IRS's refusal to allow deductions for parochial and other private school tuition
on the ground that such giving involves a quid pro quo rather than the "contribution or gift"
required under 26 USC § 170(c). See Foley v Commissioner, 844 F2d 94, 96 (2d Cir 1988), va-
cated on other grounds, 490 US 1103 (1989), citing Winters v Commissioner, 468 F2d 778, 781
(2d Cir 1972). On the other hand, the IRS has declined to encompass benefits of a traditionally
religious character under the quid pro quo label, reasoning that their primary motivation is
presumed to be charitable, notwithstanding that sometimes a tangible benefit is involved and
indeed is contingent on the contribution being made. Thus, not only do donations for the saying
of a Mass for a specific person or for an individual's playing a specific role in a synagogue re-
main deductible, but this latitude also extends to payments for pew rents, building fund as-
sessments, and periodic dues. See Rev Rul 78-366, 1978-2 Cum Bull 241 (masses); Rev Rul 70-
47, 1970-1 Cum Bull 49 (pew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues). But see
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In any event, the taxes as ballots perspective can be seen as
roughly consistent with either the encouragement or the measure-
ment view, but perhaps also as suggestive of a novel strategy. We
might now think of taxpayers as agents employed to decide where
government funds should go; these agents must pay for their
choices, or votes, in order to take their decisions more seriously."3 It
is arguable that the deduction approach is appropriate because we
should tax only earnings that the taxpayer can enjoy, deducting
those that are "spent" doing the government's work. Alternatively,
it might be said that there is no reason to pay high-income agents
more than low-bracket agents, in which case a partial credit seems
superior.
A more subtle argument is that we should imagine what the
world would be like without the charitable deduction and with the
government making many more and many larger direct grants. Tax
collections would need to rise to finance these grants; it seems rea-
sonable to imagine increased rates with progressivity comparable to
that which we presently find with a charitable deduction in place. If
so, high-income citizens would pay more than their proportional
share of the new taxes. Thus, the argument continues, it hardly
makes sense to give high-income filers in the present world greater
rewards. They are, after all, the ones who would pay more in the
alternative system. If, however, any earner contributes more than
his progressively required share, then it might be fair to give a
greater reward. This approach suggests a partial credit, or a partial
credit up to some ceiling, so that all filers have equal votes, but then
perhaps a greater credit or deduction for filers whose charitable con-
tributions exceed a specified percentage of their income. There may
therefore be an argument for the charitable deduction to resemble
Hernandez v Commissioner, 490 US 680,691-92 (1988) (disallowing the deductibility of contri-
butions to the Church of Scientology where these contributions were required to obtain the
"trainine and "auditing" associated in that religion with spiritual advancement, on the ground
that these exchanges were structured in a quid pro quo fashion). By emphasizing this exchange
rather than the question of whether the benefits secured were religious in nature, the Court
has called into question the traditional deductibility for pew rents, church dues, and other
donations for various religious services. See id at 701-03. Such doubts had been raised earlier
by other courts in a very similar context. See, for example, Graham v Commissioner, 822 F2d,
844, 850 (9th Cir 1987) ("[We are not convinced that every one of [the IRS] rulings would
comport with the analysis of section 170 that we have set forth here."). For a review of the case
law prior.to the Hernandez decision and a discussion of the contrasting standards used by the
IRS with regard to religious as opposed to secular charities, see Daniel Rattin Mitz, Note, Save
Your Local Church or Synagogue: When Are Taxpayer Contributions to Religious Organizations
Deductible Under Section 170?, 63 NYU L Rev 840 (1988).
' To the extent that the fear is that free votes would lead to corruption on the part of
charities, partial credits will probably do-although deductions are perhaps more palatable.
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other deductions that are available only when expenses of the par-
ticular kind exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer's income.'
2. Eliminating the advantages of wealth.
The preceding Part suggested that there are arguments for the
charitable deduction as opposed to a system of credits, and that
there is an argument for limiting the deduction to contributions that
are generous for a given taxpayer's income."5 I suggested a deduction
above some floor, or perhaps I should say "landing," with a partial
credit below that landing."6
Consider, by way of illustration, a 50 percent partial credit on
the first $2,000 donated by a taxpayer, with further contributions to
qualified organizations yielding a full deduction to the extent that
they exceed 3 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Tax-
payer A donates $3,000 with an adjusted gross income of $100,000.
B gives the same amount but earns $30,000. C earns $100,000 and
donates $10,000. Each of these taxpayers receives the full $1,000
credit.8" The deductions are $0 for A, $100 for B, and $5,000 for C."
"A 2 percent floor for charitable deductions was proposed by the Treasury Department
in 1969 and again in 1984 but was successfully opposed in Congress by recipient organizations.
See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 98 (Brookings 5th ed 1987). See also Louis Kaplow,
The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 Tax L Rev 1, 5-12 (1994) (arguing
that standard deductions and floors can be used interchangeably without necessarily affecting
revenues or the overall distribution of income). I use 3 percent in the illustration that follows
in the text in order to emphasize that there is nothing magical about the familiar 2 percent
base. Note also that current law accomplishes something of the same with its phase-out of
deductions, including the charitable deduction, under 26 USC § 68.
' Note that although I do not always insist on partial as opposed to full credits, I am as-
suming that full credits are undesirable because of the problem of "corruption." See text ac-
companying notes 65-66. Ajudgment to the contrary does not affect the analysis in the text,
and it makes it even plainer how to account for the separate policy question of minimiing
wealth advantages. If the corruption problem is a small one, then the influence of wealth can
be dramatically reduced simply by giving citizens vouchers to allocate to the charities of their
choice. Again, there may be some signaling advantages to allowing these vouchers to be as-
signed over the course of the year. See Part H.B.2. One advantage of a full credit system with
a per-taxpayer ceiling is that it would weaken any constitutional objection that the tax rules
violated the Establishment Clause. See text accompanying note 82. Nonbelievers could simply
choose to use their credits or vouchers far away from the influence of religions, and there would
be no advantage to those citizens who belonged to churches. All citizens would have an equal
say in the distribution of government funds.
' One argument about, and implicitly against, partial credits has been that nonitemizers
tend to be lower income earners and these earners give disproportionately to their churches.
A likely effect of a credit rather than a deduction will therefore be a redistribution of gifts
toward churches. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions:A Policy Perspective, 50
Mo L Rev 85, 101 (1985) (predicting the effect of a credit on the distribution of contributions).
' If any of these taxpayers had made qualifying contributions of $1,600, for example, then
the available credit would be only $800.
The first $2,000 given by each taxpayer generates the maximum available credit. Tax-
payer A gave an additional $1,000, but inasmuch as 3 percent of his adjusted gross income
("AGI) is $3,000, no deduction is available. B calculates 3 percent of his AGI to be $900, and
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My aim, however, is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of
deductions versus credits, or even of that choice with respect to
charitable giving. The important point is that the taxes as ballots
perspective offers both positive and normative insights. It can help
to explain or rationalize the system we have, but it can also be used
to design a system that, among other things, makes some judgment
about minimizing or even eliminating the ubiquitous advantages of
wealth. High-income "voters" can be paid or be made to pay more
than, less than, or the same as their low-income fellow citizens for
their roles as partners in choosing the beneficiaries of government
funds.
Ill. BALLOTING (AND SOME ENCOURAGING) IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
A. Collective Action and Allocation Without
Government Involvement
1. An overview of umbrella charities.
Many of the themes discussed thus far have close counterparts
in other arrangements where there are joint ventures in the interest
of allocation and solicitation of funds, but where tax law is almost
beside the point and where neither joint venturer is the government.
These analogies are interesting in themselves and offer relevant in-
sights into the issues discussed in this Article.
Consider the fundraising and allocation strategies adopted by
regional United Way organizations or other umbrella entities that
offer donors and constituent organizations economies of scale in
fundraising and perhaps in monitoring and allocating funds as well.
A rough, greatly overgeneralized, history runs as follows.89 In vari-
ous parts of the country, in the late nineteenth century, social entre-
preneurs had the idea of capitalizing on the available economies of
scale in fundraising and in monitoring recipients of funds by pre-
senting a unified front to potential contributors. Potential donors
would no longer be besieged by multiple requests and fundraising
events, and individual charities would be freed from the task of
fundraising. Moreover, large employers, disinclined to permit multi-
ple solicitations of their employees, could be encouraged to partici-
so his excess $1,000 contribution (above the $2,000 used for the credit) yields a deduction of
$100. C has an excess contribution of $8,000, which is $5,000 above 3 percent of his AGI. He
has a credit of $2,000 and a deduction of $5,000. These credits and rates are, of course, purely
illustrative. Actual rates might be set to achieve revenue neutrality (in comparison to the
system that is replaced) or receipt neutrality from the beneficiaries' perspective.
For a history of the United Way, see generally United Way of America, People and
Events:A History of the United Way (1977).
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pate in a unified fundraising campaign. These umbrella organiza-
tions, predecessors of the modem United Way, Federation of Jewish
Philanthropies, and Community Chest organizations, offered central
planning, monitoring, and professional fundraising in return for the
payment of reasonable expenses. Organizations could in some cases
be thought of as engaging in joint ventures through these umbrella
entities. Constituent organizations were sometimes required to
pledge to refrain from fundraising (either generally or only during
particular months of the year) in order to avoid the obvious collective
action problem among these organizations in the face of the tempta-
tion to enjoy the umbrella's fruits while also exploiting the suddenly
spacious fundraising field.
One obvious problem with such an arrangement is how to allo-
cate funds from an umbrella back to the constituent entities. For-
mulas relying on preventure budgets could not survive in the long
run as new charities appeared. The dominant arrangement seems
to have been that the umbrella organization, armed with much ad-
vice and responsive to a diverse board of directors drawn in large
part from its own constituents, would determine the annual grant
to each constituent. Constituents could, of course, threaten to defect,
so there is some reason to think that large constituent organizations
were treated favorably."0 But in the absence of obvious baselines,
and with serious gains from cooperation, some semblance of stability
seems to have emerged. The major slippage has been with that part
of the arrangement banning concurrent fundraising. Modem agree-
ments display great variety as to the permissibility of constituent
fundraising; it is not unusual for a large local charity, such as a hos-
pital, to receive grants from the United Way even as it raises funds
directly throughout the entire year. There are, however, likely to be
some constraints on solicitation strategies. The hospital may agree
that during the annual United Way campaign it will not solicit be-
yond its list of previous donors. This rule can be thought of as an
attempt to appease donors by limiting the number of solicitations
Larger constituents would seem to be able to make more convincing threats of defection,
because they are more likely to enjoy some economy of scale in fundraising on their own. On
the other hand, groups of smaller organizations might threaten to form their own umbrellas,
and larger constituents would presumably make threats from a position, or earlier bargain,
that already reflected the differences in ability to go it alone. Indeed, the American Red Cross,
the American Cancer Society, and umbrella groups representing hospitals proved to be regular
defectors from the ambitions represented by the United Way (and predecessor) organizations.
See id at 40, 89, 110, 113, 117 (detailing repeated examples of opposition of the American Red
Cross to federation approach); id at 187 (reporting American Cancer Society's prohibition on
local units' participation in community umbrellas). The Canadian Red Cross seems to have
presented a similar problem in that country. See id at 81-82.
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they receive, or as an attempt to reduce the ability of constituents to
threaten defection.
Over time, constituents can see that they gain by excluding
some new constituents from the umbrella and at the same time en-
couraging their loyal donors to send them funds directly and to cut
back on gifts to the umbrella entity. Constituents occasionally do
signal their own respectability by advertising their association with
a well-known umbrella, but it is rare to find a constituent trying to
advertise "its" umbrella's positive qualities the way a law school
might try to impress donors with facts about the larger university of
which it is a part. In any event, this sort of uncooperative behavior
between constituents and umbrellas (less permanently tied to one
another than a given law school and its university) eventually gen-
erated an innovation; many umbrella organizations now give donors
a choice between earmarking their contributions to specific constitu-
ents or leaving them unrestricted for the umbrella to allocate in its
wisdom.9' In principle, there could emerge umbrellas that receive
nothing but restricted donations, because their comparative advan-
tage could lie entirely in the fundraising department and not at all
in the allocation among constituents, where internal politics could
lead to costly rent-seeking. In practice, such an umbrella would be
unable to attract new constituent organizations because donors are
likely to allocate gifts only to constituents that have explained their
function. This "explaining" is often the process of fundraising itself.s2
2. United Ways and alternative mechanisms for
fund allocation.
We come finally to the allocation problem that is most like that
which I have associated with the charitable deduction and the tax
checkoff. To the extent that donors send in unrestricted fumds to an
umbrella, how should we expect these funds to be allocated to the
constituent organizations? In particular, allocations might depend
on the restricted or earmarked character of the funds that have been
received by this umbrella fundraiser. There are four possibilities.
The first is for the umbrella to set out a formula in advance, based
1 See Nancy K Austin, Back from the Brink, Working Woman 47,50 (Jan 1997) (describ-
ing the implementation of a "donor choice" program, through which donors may earmark how
their donations will be used); Renate Robey, United Way on Way Back Charity Sheds Scandal's
Effects, Denver Post B-01 (Nov 12, 1997) (discussing United Way's policy of allowing donors
to earmark contributions).
' We can, however, imagine a limited ballot distributed by the umbrella in which each
constituent described itself and asked for gifts. Elections for directors sometimes involve such
brochures and ballots. The overwhelming majority of voters know nothing about the candidates
other than what is contained in this mailing. Umbrella organizations might also invite new
constituents to continue their separate fundraising for a limited period.
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on the needs and defection capacities of the constituents, and per-
haps based on the social good and reputational interest of the um-
brella as well; dollars allocated by donors then go toward satisfying
their intended beneficiary's predetermined allocation. Thus, al-
though they may be deceived in this regard, donors who restrict or
allocate their gifts make no real allocation decision, except possibly
in situations where the constituent entity they identify receives
designated funds in excess of the amount the umbrella had planned
to allocate to it. A similar situation may occur within any given
charity's budget and fundraising calculations-donors often wish to
affect project decisions, while managers regard themselves as better
informed. Even when managers are eager to promise donors that
their gifts will be applied at the margin to a particular project, and
thus be restricted in a meaningful way, it is difficult both to draft
such a promise and to prove that it has been kept.
Two other strategies for coordinating designated and unre-
stricted private contributions are fairly obvious, as is their evolu-
tionary origin. Umbrella organizations face defections from constitu-
ents and from donors who find that they are unable to engage in
true designation under the first approach. As might have been pre-
dicted, some umbrellas therefore switch to the mixed system of the
second approach, in which a portion of each designated gift goes to-
ward satisfying the predetermined allocation for the designated con-
stituent, while the remainder truly increases the designated con-
stituent's share.
Under the third strategy, the umbrella is simply an intermedi-
ary with respect to designated gifts, but it allocates undesignated,
unrestricted contributions according to its predetermined formula.
There is of course the possibility that this professed strategy will
unravel because next year's "predetermined" allocations inevitably
might be determined with some reference to which constituents
seemed underfunded in previous years. But this unraveling may
also be controlled by the threat of defections and by the fact that
large donors and constituents, who are the most likely to favor en-
forceable designation, are well represented in the decisionmaking
apparatus of the umbrella.
Each of the above strategies can be found in actual practice, as
can a fourth, which is the most interesting in analytic terms. The
umbrella might offer itself as a fundraiser and allocative intermedi-
ary such that undesignated funds are distributed according to the
relative amounts received by each constituent in designated funds
channeled through the intermediary. Imagine that a regional United
Way adopting this strategy collects equal amounts of designated and
undesignated funds. If 10 percent of the designated funds are as-
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signed by donors to the local hospital, then the hospital will also re-
ceive 10 percent of the undesignated funds available for allocation
by this United Way chapter. Designating donors will have leveraged
their contributions. Thus, the hospital will suddenly be enthusiastic
about encouraging its loyal supporters to give money indirectly
through the United Way rather than directly, where there is no one-
to-one match. We can think of this strategy as employing contribu-
tions as ballots, just as the earlier discussion emphasized the role of
taxes as ballots." In this setting, however, the contributions provide
greater leverage than the charitable tax deduction alone. A contribu-
tion of $1,000 to the United Way designated for the local hospital by
an itemizing taxpayer-donor in the 50 percent tax bracket costs the
private donor $500, elicits $500 from the government in the form of
-the tax revenue lost by way of the deduction, and earns another
$1,000 from other private donors who gave undesignated funds to
this United Way organization. 4 The hospital receives $2,000, the
designating donor finds her net cost leveraged or multiplied by four,
and the United Way enjoys the bureaucratic emoluments associated
with processing $2,000.
I revisit the potential collective action problem only briefly, in
order to point to some new wrinkles. Donors to our United Way face
less uncertainty than in the campaign finance checkoff system, be-
cause they can await information about the receipts of both the local
hospital and the United Way. On the other hand, the United Way is
unlikely to share or at least to publicize information regarding ei-
ther the division between designated and undesignated fimds or the
allocation of designated funds by other donors.95 A donor who wants
to designate the hospital as a recipient only if its receipts so far are
within a given range, and who would otherwise allocate his contri-
bution elsewhere or even refrain from giving, might suffer from the
collective action problem associated with this information deficiency.
Nondesignating donors might also be seen as employing the designators as better in-
formed decisionmakers or monitors. But this optimistic analogy to the charitable deduction
analysis would be more fitting if the umbrella advertised its choice among allocative mecha-
nisms. In practice, there is some secrecy as to the marginal impact of designation. See note 95
and accompanying text.
' The example continues with the assumption that one-half of this United Ways receipts
are undesignated. The undesignated contributions also generate tax deductions and, hence,
government "contributions."
There are at least two explanations for the apparent secrecy. First, the umbrella organi-
zation negotiates with constituents one at a time over their ability to continue to raise funds
on their own. Asymmetric information of this kind often benefits the central, repeat player.
Second, the United Way would like to attract contributions from all possible donors, and it may
be able to leave all those who prefer different sharing arrangements with the impression that
the arrangement they prefer is indeed the one in effect.
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My intuition is that this collective action problem is sufficiently
great as to make the designations-as-ballots system more remark-
able than ideal or even stable. It is perfectly rational to give to a
United Way campaign that follows this leveraging or balloting strat-
egy, because one might be of the view either that other donors are
more expert at assessing the relative needs and efficiency of con-
stituents, or that it is a good thing to encourage other donors to give
to charity by extending the levers offered by the United Way. But
the flaws in the collective choice mechanism, arising mostly out of
the inability of individual donors to know their marginal positions,
make allocation decisions difficult to privatize. I suspect that dis-
satisfaction with results will lead to continuing experimentation and
even cycling." Moreover, while it is true that the fourth strategy's
leverage effect might attract more designating donors than it would
repel with its collective action problem, the strategy itself seems un-
stable because constituents will start investing more in advertising
themselves in order to attract more of these (potent) designated con-
tributions. In short, the analogy between umbrellas' allocations and
governmental funding by the charitable deduction is interesting, but
it is by no means clear that either sector has much to learn from the
other.
B. Matching Grants
There are two familiar kinds of matching-gift programs: those
where the initiator identifies the target beneficiary and then seeks
to encourage other gift-giving to that beneficiary, and those where
the initiator allows other, targeted donors to leverage their alloca-
tive decisions about which charities to support."7 The initiator in this
second category may also intend to encourage gift-giving on the part
of this target group.
There is a good deal to be said about the first kind of matching
program, as when a large donor to a law school challenges recent
graduates (or the dean's fundraising ability) by announcing that the
donor will match $1 million in gifts given by some set of classes, but
the matching gift will be zero if less than $1 million is raised from
" Thus, one year some local charity will receive zero and the dissatisfaction will lead to
a switch to some funds under the control of bureaucrats rather than designators. But then
defections will generate some movement back to the umbrella-as-intermediary model.
"The first kind of matching program normally involves a large donor with great attach-
ment to the charity in question, while the second kind often involves an employer or someone
else with a link to the decisionmaker. Put differently, we are not surprised ifX, who is a friend
of Y, proposes a wager or makes a gift in honor of an occasion to "the charity of Y's choice," but
we would be surprised if a philanthropic individual with no such preexisting link to a target
audience sought to increase the audience's contributions by offering to match their gifts to the
charities that they select.
1998] 423
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that target group. If there is any matching-as-balloting in this offer,
it is that some large match-offering donors, such as foundations, can
be seen as looking for "votes" of confidence on the part of the target
group. If the charity can demonstrate that indeed thousands of small
voters will sacrifice for this charity, then the large donor is duly im-
pressed. This view is supported by the oft-heard claim that founda-
tions pay attention to universities' alumni percentage participation
in annual giving or other campaigns."
Most matching programs, however, are initiated not by outsid-
ers but rather by loyal, seasoned insider-donors. They should proba-
bly be understood as seeking to overcome smaller donors' sense that
no small gift makes much of a difference. It is as if we experimented
with voter turnout by promising voters in one county in a state elec-
tion that their votes would be multiplied by two while voters in the
other counties would have but one vote each. It is, I suppose, some-
what plausible that this target group would show higher turnout
rates."9 Another explanation for these matching programs is that the
loyal match-offering donor gives the dean an excuse to solicit the
target group aggressively, with the claim that there is a special rea-
son to approach each potential donor at the present time, inasmuch
as this unique, time-sensitive matching opportunity is available." °
If these matching programs really aim to encourage giving by
others, then a puzzle is that they rarely if ever focus on marginal
behavior. A match initiator could offer to match contributions above
the level obtained in the preceding year or above the level contrib-
uted by individual donors in preceding years. Similarly, the match
See Doug Stutler and Dave Calvario, In Alumni Support, Satisfaction Matters; Student
Satisfaction MotivatesAlumni Donors, Fund Raising Management 12 (Nov 1996). Other expla-
nations of why fundraisers pay so much attention to their own organizations' participation
percentages include the possibility that participation at any level is a good predictor of future
participation-when donors may have more wealth at their disposal. United Way campaigns,
for example, report cumulative receipts as well as comparisons with previous years' totals, but
not the percentage participation of the local population-presumably because the report could
discourage other donors. Particular employers do, however, often worry about the percentage
participation of their own workforces in a United Way campaign. In short, there appears to be
a tipping point such that reports of substantial participation (by employees or alumni of an
organization) are thought to encourage further participation as nondonors begin to see them-
selves as free riders rather than suckers.
Note that the matching-as-ballots possibility described inthe text suggests that we should
find matching offers of this kind for programs rather than for bricks and mortar.
"If we could hold enough other variables constant, it would be interesting to test the
proposition in the text by assessing whether voter turnout in elections where there is a depar-
ture from the one-person-one-vote baseline supports the claim that turnout is higher where
the marginal vote is more "valuable."
" Thus, we never find a donor offering $10,000 as a 1:100 challenge match if the dean can
raise $1 million from foundations! Note also that in practice many match initiators are loyal
insiders who may be expected to contribute their specified amounts even if the target group
is unable to meet the terms of the match.
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could be three-for-one for amounts raised above $X and up to $Y,
rather than the common dollar-for-dollar up to $Y. An odd solution
to this puzzle is that the point may be to encourage not the apparent
target group, but rather the loyal large donor who initiates the
matching grant.
Another hint that the matches-as-encouragements idea should
not to be taken too seriously is that there is a collective action prob-
lem in responding to the matching offer that would suggest (counter-
factually) that last minute responses might be common. Imagine, for
example that the match initiator offers to match all gifts up to $2
million, so long as at least $1 million is raised. A donor who is moti-
vated by the matching offer must worry either that less than $1 mil-
lion will be raised or that more than $2 million will be raised; in ei-
ther case his gift effectively is not matched. Fundraisers do not re-
port delayed responses following a matching offer, although it is pos-
sible that most donors respond quickly (perhaps even to encourage
the few marginal decisionmakers to see that the $1 million trigger
will be reached), but some donors do indeed wait for the necessary
information and then respond if they are matched on the margin.
Put differently, the charitable deduction is in a sense superior to
most matching programs. Most match initiators have set limits on
the amounts they will contribute and therefore create more of a col-
lective action problem for match responders who might like to know
the marginal impact of their gifts. As a matching donor with unlim-
ited funds, the government avoids creating this particular collective
action problem.
The second kind of matching program bears more resemblance
to the balloting generated by the charitable deduction. The most
common example is an employer who matches individual employee
contributions. Whether or not there are limits on the amounts that
will be matched or on the types of charities that can benefit from
these programs, there is obviously a significant allocative task per-
formed by the individual employee. The employees (or a corporate
board, perhaps) could have decided to vote on the question of where
to contribute the amount budgeted by the employer for charitable
giving, but voting is instead done in a proportional manner such
that every vote counts. From a public choice and democratic theory
perspective, it is interesting that this method is once again likely to
avoid the problem of a disappointed minority. It is also likely to re-
duce a kind of rent-seeking.'' The same advantages could be en-
"'The equivalent of rent-seeking in the workplace would be energy expended on convincing
fellow employees to "vote" for or against certain causes. Employees might also lobby to have
certain causes excluded or favored in the matching process.
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joyed in other settings, but we do not expect a majority, poised to get
its way entirely, to delegate decisionmaking to the individual level
where the majority will get less of its way. In this context, however,
management may care more about the principle of charitable giving
or about public relations than about the precise identities of the
charities it supports. Management is likely to concentrate on reduc-
ing workplace dissatisfaction and campaigning rather than prefer-
ring some charities to the exclusion of others.
IV. MORE BALLOTING THROUGH TAXES
The examples of direct democracy through proportional voting
that we have seen in both the campaign finance checkoff and the
charitable deduction raise the question of whether we might engage
in more direct democracy of this sort. °2 There are really several
questions lurking here, because this species of direct democracy can
take a variety of forms, from fairly explicit balloting, as illustrated
by the campaign finance checkoff, to deductions and credits that are
simply open to interpretation as instances of balloting, delegation,
or "privatization." One possibility is to expect legislatures to maxi-
mize their own power and ability to generate rent-seeking behav-
ior.'0 3 Following this approach, we might expect our representatives
in Congress to avoid extending the checkoff scheme to their fund-
raising 4 and to avoid delegation where organized interest groups
currently invest heavily to influence legislation.
But this simplistic, nearly univariable approach generates con-
flicting implications in many contexts. Powerful senators and repre-
sentatives might be expected to prefer less delegation and more leg-
islatively fashioned tax and spending packages, since they will have
a large say in any such legislative product. Meanwhile, other legisla-
tors who do not have enough power to influence legislative spending
decisions substantially might prefer deductions, which would at
least allow them to boast to their constituents that they provided tax
reductions. 5 Interest groups can be expected to form in favor of both
delegation and centralization, with their relative strength depending
on the industry in question. One tentative generalization is that de-
'"The distinctive characteristic of these taxes as ballots examples, as well as the private
sector matching programs discussed in Part III, is the nature of the delegation to the "voters."
The taxpayer-voters are asked not to vote something up or down (as is the usual case with
exercises in direct democracy), but rather to make allocations or determine a budget by voting
in a way that makes every vote count.
" See note 110.
... Unless, perhaps, soft money is as good as hard money from the perspective of legislators.
" Of course, an unambiguous reduction in the tax burden would suggest the cessation of
a spending program with no substitution of (revenue-reducing) deductions.
[65:387
Taxes as Ballots
centralized power within a legislature can be expected to lead to a
substitution of tax deductions (and the delegation of "spending" that
that approach entails) for spending programs. A contemporary ex-
ample illustrating such a substitution is the apparent reduction in
government support for universities followed by some kind of deduc-
tion or credit for tuition payments."e A very similar example, further
reflecting the American taste for private choice over government
involvement, is the tax credit for child-care expenses.10 7 This credit
allows some consumers to allocate federal funds to suppliers, many
of whom would not survive if the federal government itself estab-
lished and operated child-care centers. Despite these examples of
delegation, there are many contexts (particularly where deductions
or credits are unworkable or simply unattractive) where we should
not expect legislatures readily to give up their decisionmaking and
patronage potential. Thus, it would be startling to find direct democ-
racy of any kind with respect to the question of where to build new
military bases, when to offer exemptions from antitrust law, or the
extent to which patent and copyright monopolies ought to be ex-
tended.
If we allow for the possibility that legislative decisionmaking
can be public-regarding rather than strictly self-serving, then dele-
gation to the voters or donors makes sense when there is some de-
sire to encourage private action (such as volunteering for the chari-
ties to which one contributes) or where the people have more infor-
mation than their legislators. This last point may help to explain the
tax deduction for charitable contributions and even the proportional-
voting character of the ballot represented by that tool. Voters across
the country are unlikely to be well informed about my local hospital
or your university, so a conventional exercise in direct democracy
would not delegate decisionmaking to better informed parties. How-
'o Readers inclined to object to politicians' pandering to the upper-middle class by propos-
ing tuition tax credits for college might rethink their objections if these credits are viewed as
a substitute for direct grants to universities. The substitution argument is imperfect, however.
Students and their parents can allocate federal funds to diverse colleges, voting with their
matriculation and credits, but by and large the allocations to a large number of colleges will
be invariant because these schools will fill up their entering classes regardless of how satisfied
customers are in the short term. Only struggling schools will feel the impact of the preferences
exhibited by these voters. This is, perhaps, the major difference between a modest tuition
credit system and a large-scale voucher system of the kind presently debated and of the sort
introduced for veterans of the Second World War. This early example of a voucher system is
noted in Gerard M. Brannon and James Strnad, Alternative Approaches to Encouraging Phil-
anthropic Activities, in Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 4 Research
Papers 2361, 2383 (US Dept of the Treasury 1977). A more complicated system could make
better use of the direct democracy notion, but I will leave for another day the larger question
of getting the most out of vouchers and tax credits in this context.
'"See 26 USC § 21 (1994).
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ever, alumni of your university and citizens of my local community
might be fairly well informed about their respective organizations.
Some large contributors will be especially well informed, as mem-
bers of governing boards, or simply because they investigate before
"investing." Matching grants through a tax deduction in such in-
stances may be expected to delegate decisions to the well informed,
and the proportional character of the deduction for most filers per-
mits intensity of preferences (or knowledge) to be recorded.
Apart from noting that various existing deductions and credits
can be viewed as instances of taxes as ballots, it may be useful to
specify other public decisions regarding which we might expect or
even suggest the growth of the taxes as ballots idea-but where
there is not yet any hint of a deduction, credit, checkoff, or other
balloting tool. Characteristics that would make a particular decision
well-suited for the taxes as ballot mechanism include the likelihood
that significant interest groups preferred or did not object to delega-
tion by the legislature to more popular decisionmaking, the possi-
bility that legislators might avoid creating dissatisfied minorities by
delegating away some decisionmaking, and (ideally) the potential for
capitalizing on the knowledge and experiences of voters.
Consider first the possibility of using the taxes as ballots idea
with respect to foreign aid appropriations. Voters could be asked to
allocate up to $X among a list of countries. The checkoff could
amount to a full credit, or to something slightly less than that. Con-
gress could borrow from some of the umbrella fundraisers' practices
by appropriating a portion of the foreign aid budget legislatively and
then allowing individuals to allocate the balance of the foreign aid
budget or to decide the size of this budget beyond that legislatively
announced amount.08 On the one hand, the foreign aid context
might seem to be a particularly poor location for the expansion of the
taxes as ballots strategy, inasmuch as Congress will have access to
more rather than less information than will voters regarding na-
tional security interests and the effectiveness of past expenditures
abroad. Moreover, voters are ill-positioned to monitor the recipients
of foreign aid. On the other hand, these appropriations have become
quite unpopular in Congress, because voters are perceived as rebel-
ling against representatives who support them. In addition, foreign
aid appropriations may be an appropriate issue for direct decision-
making if the legislature is susceptible to cycling preferences re-
garding this issue.0 9
" The United Way model suggests that Congress might wish to hide its formula or the size
of its minimum budget, see note 95 and accompanying text, but this sort of secrecy in the for-
eign aid context seems unwise and politically unlikely.
'"See note 96 and accompanying text. There are almost surely such cyclical preferences
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There is something to be said for this delegation to relatively
ignorant decisionmakers from both a positive and normative per-
spective. Voters may be badly informed, but they are also relatively
difficult to influence. Indeed, one source of their objections to con-
gressional foreign aid appropriations may be news of intense rent-
seeking by foreign interests. These interests could be expected to
have some influence over voters as well, but it seems plausible that
direct democracy in this context (and in many others) would reduce
the rent-seeking associated with political decisionmaking." If we
exercise some caution in designing the scheme-for example by re-
fraining from offering full credits where these credits might easily
be bought-interest groups will normally find it difficult to make
socially undesirable offers to the voters. Thus, if taxpayers are of-
fered the opportunity to appropriate up to $5 each to one of several
countries eligible for foreign aid, interested parties will have a diffi-
cult time investing in efficient advertising (or other forms of rent-
seeking) in order to influence these millions of small designators."1
One path to this intuition is to think of how little commercial adver-
tising we find for products that cost no more than $5 or $10 and that
any given consumer only purchases once. I suppose it is possible
that the new hurdles faced by interest groups would lead to more
rather than less rent-seeking, but my intuition is that as the profit-
ability of a given rent-seeking investment falls, there will be signifi-
cantly less of that activity. If rent-seeking behavior regarding for-
in the case of foreign aid appropriations. As a normative matter, there is therefore a case to
be made for proportional popular decisionmaking in this setting (allowing a new collective
action problem to dominate in order to have nearly random results rather than tyrant-
determined results). However, as a positive matter it is noteworthy that the checkoff first
emerged where cycling preferences were most improbable, see notes 43-44 and accompanying
text, so that its use should perhaps not be expected in this setting.
"'1 I use "rent-seeking" to refer to all forms of social waste associated with political (or com-
parable) decisionmaldng. The concept was first systematically explored in Gordon Tullock, The
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W Econ J 224,228 (1967), reprinted in James
M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-
Seeking Society 39,44 (Texas A&M 1980) ("tEixpenditures [on lobbying] ... are purely waste-
ful from the standpoint of society as a whole; they are spent not in increasing wealth, but in
attempting to transfer or resist transfer of wealth."); and the term "rent-seeking" was first
introduced by Anne 0. Krueger, The Politieal Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am Econ
Rev 291 (1974), reprinted in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, eds, Toward A Theory of the
Rent-Seeking Society 51. For a useful overview, see Gordon Tullock, Rents and Rent-Seeking,
in Charles K Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds, The Political Economy of
Rent-Seeking 51 (Kluwer 1988); Gordon Tullock, rent seeking, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate,
and Peter Newman, eds, 4 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 147 (Macmillan
1987).
.
11 It would be even more difficult to bribe these voter-taxpayers. And note that the analysis
does not change much in the absence of a per-taxpayer ceiling. A similar point about the diffi-
culty of corrupting many small decisions was made in the context of the $3 campaign checkoff
scheme. See note 66.
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eign expenditures is in fact reduced by the use of taxes as ballots,
then a similar advantage might accompany the use of this mecha-
nism in other contexts (even where citizens are less well informed
than their representatives). Thus one can imagine direct democratic
decisionmaking regarding a choice among defense suppliers, loca-
tions for military bases, crop subsidy programs, allocations among
the branches of the armed services, or subsidies to various indus-
tries. In all these examples there appears to be a great deal of rent-
seeking associated with legislative allocations, and therefore the
possibility of gaining by delegating to the uninformed."
CONCLUSION
Congress does not appear eager to reclaim for itself the deci-
sionmaking authority that it has delegated away through the chari-
table deduction. This may be because the charitable deduction is
politically popular, or it may reflect a recognition that the deduction
is a very useful social choice mechanism at least as compared to the
seriously flawed alternatives we can imagine. But it may also be
that this interesting example of "taxes as ballots" is unusual, and
that there are few other areas where comparable political and deci-
sionmaking realities suggest new applications of the decisionmaking
mechanisms discussed here. A positive argument could be made in
"There is, however, the danger that interest groups will thrive even with direct demo-
cratic decisionmaking, perhaps because they will control the framing of questions (such as the
list of countries among which taxpayers must allocate funds) or, in the case of a conventional
exercise in direct democracy, the framing of referenda. Compare Riker, 67 Chi Kent L Rev at
793 (cited in note 24) (arguing that referenda are subject to manipulation by the agenda-
setter), with Gillette, 86 Mich L Rev at 978-82 (cited in note 22) (suggesting that legislatures
are likely to be easier to capture than is the electorate as a whole).
Although my focus in the text is on the potential for taxes as ballots where there has of yet
been no move toward delegation, I noted earlier the need for further exploration of instances
where some delegation is already found, as it is in the education arena, albeit not necessarily
through the tax system. See note 106. School vouchers, or other ballots regarding education
expenditures, may capitalize on the expertise of parents, but note that in this context the good
in question is largely private rather than nonrival in character. Those who use school vouchers
are not only providing information as to the relative quality of schools but also are selfishly
consuming educational services. Indeed, to the extent that their contributions to these schools
often exceed normal tuition levels, charitable deductions-and thus matching government
funds-are already available even where there is no explicit voucher program.
Finally, it is also possible that it is the proportional, rather than the decentralized, charac-
ter of the taxes as ballots idea that best supports the claim that this form of decisionmaking
will generate less rent-seeking than comparable legislative decisions. This argument is sup-
ported by the literature on discontinuities or "cliffs," which suggests that a party might invest
more where there are all-or-nothing payoffs than where payoffs are smoother, as they are with
proportional voting. This possibility may explain the fact that much more is spent on cam-
paigns in winner-take-all contests as opposed to proportional, parliamentary elections. But I
will leave for another day the link between proportional voting (or proportional appropriations)
and rent-seeking.
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this regard, although I have avoided making it here, that our legal
system may in fact choose the best available mechanism for many
diverse decisions.
An obvious piece of unfinished business is to examine other tax
deductions and to explore the ways in which these deductions facili-
tate allocative or other decisions that otherwise might have been
made legislatively or even through more conventional exercises in
direct democracy. I have hinted at my interest in education subsidies
and local and state taxes in this regard,"' but there are other less
obvious (or perhaps weaker) examples as well, including the medical
deduction. I leave these tasks for another day.
' See note 112. 1 do not intend to abandon the perspective of linking delegation to prefer-
ence aggregation. Thus, as I noted, the interest deductions make the government a kind of
partner in business and in housing construction and so forth, see text accompanying note 58.
But most other deductions are best understood as a means of measuring income or of providing
a subsidy rather than as a method of aggregating preferences.
1998]

